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INTRODUCTION 
Respondents have attempted to create a complicated 
case out of undisputed dispositive facts and well-settled 
controlling law. Park Meadows' summary judgment is 
appealable, as is the district court's denial of First 
Interstate's motion for partial summary judgment. Despite the 
factual irrelevances bantered about at length by respondents, 
the guarantors of the Racquet Club Note have no tenable 
defense to liability. This Court is respectfully asked to 
read with care the controlling legal precedents which 
respondents' brief consistently misconstrue. Indeed, the 
facts and law establish respondents' liability, and partial 
summary judgment should be entered by this Court. 
I. RESOLUTION OF THE PARK MEADOWS APPEAL IS NECESSARY 
Respondents contend that appeal of Park Meadows' 
summary judgment is unnecessary because First Interstate did 
not seek a deficiency claim against Park Meadows in their 
complaint, and the only relief sought against Park Meadows 
(foreclosure of the Racquet Club property) has already been 
granted. First Interstate is astonished by this argument. 
A brief review of the facts leading to this appeal 
explains First Interstate's astonishment. Prior to 
commencement of this action, Park Meadows was subject to 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings in the United States 
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Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. In re Park Meadows 
Investment Co., a/k/a Park Meadows Development Co.. Bankr. No. 
86C-01060. First Interstate petitioned for relief from the 
automatic stay to foreclose on the deed of trust affecting the 
Racquet Club property. Relief was granted, and First 
Interstate filed its complaint seeking foreclosure of the 
trust deed, appointment of a receiver, and collection of any 
deficiency from the guarantors of the loan secured by the 
trust deed. First Interstate did not pursue a deficiency 
claim against Park Meadows in its complaint because such 
action was precluded by the bankruptcy stay. Accordingly, 
First Interstate named Park Meadows only because of its 
ownership of the Racquet Club property. 
Early in the litigation, the Racquet Club property 
was sold pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. The focus 
of the litigation then shifted to the liability of the 
guarantors of the Racquet Club Note (the Beckers, Dougans, and 
Ayers) for any deficiency. Eventually, the district court 
issued an order granting the Beckers' and Dougans' motion for 
summary judgment excusing them from liability as guarantors. 
Based on that order, Park Meadows moved for a parallel summary 
judgment. First Interstate protested arguing, in part, that 
the motion was improper because First Interstate was not 
seeking a deficiency against Park Meadows in the proceedings. 
Notwithstanding First Interstate's arguments, the district 
-2-
court granted Park Meadows' motion• Now, after Park Meadows 
has prevailed in the district court, Park Meadows has changed 
course. Park Meadows now agrees with First Interstate that 
its summary judgment was improper because First Interstate was 
not seeking a deficiency in the district court action. 
First Interstate concurs that Park Meadows' summary 
judgment was improperly granted, but submits that appeal is 
now necessary to avoid "injuriously affecting the rights of 
some party to the litigation." McRae v. Jackson, 52 6 P.2d 
1190, 1191 (Utah 1974). Dismissal of the appeal would estop 
First Interstate from pursuing a deficiency claim against Park 
Meadows through the bankruptcy claims process based on the 
preclusive effect of the summary judgment. It is also 
apparent that appeal is necessary to avoid injuriously 
affecting the rights of the guarantors who, if found liable in 
this appeal, may be precluded from asserting rights against 
Park Meadows based on similar preclusion doctrines. The Park 
Meadows appeal would be moot only if Park Meadows stipulated 
to set aside their summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court 
should deny respondents' request to dismiss. 
II. FIRST INTERSTATE'8 MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS APPEALABLE 
Respondents argue for the second time before this 
Court that the order denying First Interstate's September 26, 
-3-
1988, motion for partial summary judgment (the "September 
Motion") is not appealable.1 This Court .should, again, reject 
respondents' arguments.2 
First Interstate does not dispute respondents' 
assertions that the order denying the September Motion, by 
itself, was not a final judgment, that the order was not 
certified pursuant to Rule 54(b), and that First Interstate 
did not appeal the order within 30 days. However, none of 
these facts are relevant to the question of whether denial of 
the September Motion is appealable. 
As previously set forth in First Interstate's 
response to respondents' motion for summary disposition, it is 
well-established that when an order finally resolves a dispute 
between two parties and that order is appealed, the appellate 
court may review all intermediate otherwise non-appealable 
orders. See Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 
1277, 1289 (1937); Rilev V. Carl, 622 P.2d 228, 230 (Mont. 
1981); In re Estate of Keeven. 716 P.2d 1224, 1228-29 (Idaho 
1986); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. St. Denis, 81 Nev. 103, 399 
P.2d 135 (Nev. 1965). The Utah Supreme Court applied this 
rule in Jones v. American Coin Portfolios, Inc.. 709 P.2d 303 
1 Respondents' argument was specifically brought before this Court and 
fully briefed by both parties pursuant to respondents' June 19, 1989, 
motion for summary disposition. 
2 This Court issued an order denying respondents' motion for summary 
disposition on October 11, 1989. 
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(Utah 1985). Jones involved an appeal from a partial summary 
judgment which had been certified pursuant to Rule 54(b), The 
partial summary judgment finally adjudicated only the 
respective rights of the plaintiff, American Coin, and one of 
several defendants. The court reversed the partial summary 
judgment and reviewed and reversed a prior interlocutory order 
denying American Coin's motion for summary judgment. 
The reasons for permitting review of all 
interlocutory orders together with the final order resolving a 
dispute between parties, whether a Rule 54(b) final order or 
other final order, are the promotion of judicial economy and 
the avoidance of piecemeal appeals. If an appellate court 
reverses a final judgment and remands a case, a review of all 
prior interlocutory orders entered prior to remand promotes 
judicial economy: the issues before the trial court are 
reduced, and the need for a second appeal involving the prior 
interlocutory orders after remand is eliminated. See In re 
Estate of Keeven. 716 P.2d 1224, 1229 (Idaho 1986). If this 
Court reverses the Beckers' and Dougans' summary judgment and 
remands this case without reviewing the denial of the 
September Motion, the district court would be required to 
conduct a trial on the issue of liability as well as the issue 
of damages. If, however, this Court reviews the denial of the 
September Motion and rules that the Beckers and Dougans are 
liable as a matter law, the only issue remaining would be the 
-5-
amount of that liability. Moreover, regardless of how this 
Court rules with respect to the propriety of the denial of the 
September Motion, it would eliminate another appeal to address 
that same issue after disposition on remand. Therefore, both 
precedent and principal clearly require this Court to review 
the denial of the September Motion. 
III. NONE OP RESPONDENTS' "NOTICE OP DEFAULT" DEFENSES 
PRECLUDE A FINDING OF LIABILITY FOR THE GUARANTORS OF 
THE RACQUET CLUB NOTE 
Based on respondents' arguments below, the district 
court found that First Interstate had "no cause of action" 
against the Beckers and Dougans for collection of the 
deficiency on the Racquet Club Note. Respondents have 
supported this result with two arguments. The first is that 
the terms of the Guaranty required that a "15-day" notice of 
the primary obligor's default be given to the guarantors as a 
condition precedent to the guarantors' liability. The second 
is that acceleration was improper because notice of default 
under the Racquet Club Note was defective or not given to the 
right parties. Both arguments are flawed and should be 
rejected by this Court. 
Preliminarily, it must be noted that whether the 
guarantors were uncompensated or compensated is irrelevant to 
respondents' arguments. If the Guaranty does not provide for 
notice as a condition precedent to the guarantors' liability, 
-6-
no amount of alleged favoritism in the law can create it. 
Likewise, if the primary obligor is liable for the accelerated 
amount under the Racquet Club Note, the guarantors are also 
liable for the accelerated amount, and whether the guarantors 
are compensated or uncompensated makes no difference. 
Even assuming the law treats compensated guarantors 
differently from uncompensated, or gratuitous, guarantors, 
this Court should apply the rules applicable to compensated 
guarantors. To be a compensated guarantor, one need not be in 
the surety business, but merely receive consideration for his 
engagement. Lloyd Corp. v. O'Connor, 258 Or. 33, 479 P.2d 
744, 745 (1971). Even where there has been no payment for the 
promise of a guarantor, courts have held that a guarantor may 
be compensated based on his beneficial relationship with 
respect to his corporate principal. See, e.g.. In re 
Landwehr's Estate, 286 Mich. 698, 282 N.W. 873, 876 (1938). 
In this case, even though Becker, Dougan, and Ayers 
were not technically paid for their engagement, they received 
consideration because they were the sole shareholders, 
officers, and directors of Park City Racquet Club and any 
benefits from the loan flowed directly to them. The 
engagement of the guarantors was more than a personal favor; 
it was an agreement made to consummate a transaction for their 
direct economic benefit. In certain circumstances (none of 
which are relevant here), uncompensated guarantors may be 
-7-
regarded as favorites of the law. This favortism is based on 
policy considerations because they get all the downside and 
none of the upside from the transactions which they guarantee. 
In this case, that policy is inapplicable. Thus, where 
appropriate, respondents' arguments should be construed 
strictly in favor of a finding of liability. 
A. The Beckers and Douaans Were Not Entitled to 
Notice of Default as Guarantors. 
Respondents assert complete discharge of the 
guarantors because First Interstate failed to fulfill a notice 
requirement as a condition precedent to the guarantors' 
liability. There was, however, no such requirement in the 
Guaranty. 
An absolute guaranty, such as the one executed by the 
Beckers, Dougans, and Ayers guarantying the Racquet Club Note, 
does not require notice of the primary obligor's default to 
the guarantors as a condition precedent to liability unless 
expressly provided for in the guaranty. See, e.g., Walter E. 
Heller & Co. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 151 Ga. App. 898, 
262 S.E.2d 151, 154 (1979); Yama v. Sicrman, 114 Colo. 323, 165 
P.2d 191, 192-93 (1945). Finding nothing regarding notice in 
the express language of the Guaranty,3 respondents argue that 
3 The language of the Guaranty provides, in its entirety, as follows 
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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the provisions of the Racquet Club Note concerning the 
"undersigned" refer not only to the maker of the Racquet Club 
Note, but also to the "undersigned" of the Guaranty• Thus, 
respondents contend, the notice of default required to be 
given to the maker of the Racquet Club Note also applied to 
the "undersigned" guarantors. 
The basis of respondents' argument is that since the 
Racquet Club Note and the Guaranty are on the same piece of 
paper, any obligation, duty, right, or privilege pertaining to 
the "undersigned" in the Racquet Club Note also applies to the 
"undersigned" of the Guaranty. Consequently, the notice of 
default required to the "undersigned" in the Racquet Club Note 
also created an obligation to notify the "undersigned" of the 
Guaranty. Although respondents generously support this 
argument with numerous citations concerning contract 
interpretation, respondents cite no case which describes how 
the substantive provisions of a primary obligation affecting 
the primary obligor become directly applicable to a guarantor 
by virtue of the fact that related documents should be read 
together. Furthermore, that the "undersigned" of the Racquet 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
undersigned jointly and severally guarantee payment 
of this Promissory Note (Secured by Deed of Trust) 
and further guarantee payment of the entire 
indebtedness evidenced thereby and the Deed of Trust 
securing the same. 
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Club Note and the Guaranty have identical rights and 
obligations is absurd. 
Including the reference providing for notice of 
default, there are 30 references to the "undersigned" in the 
Racquet Club Note. There is one reference to the 
"undersigned" in the Guaranty. Indisputably, the references 
in the Racquet Club Note are to the undersigned maker and the 
reference in the Guaranty is to the undersigned guarantors. 
For example, one provision in the Racquet Club Note provides 
that the note is consideration for a loan to the 
"undersigned," another requires payments from the 
"undersigned," and another requires notice of default to be 
given to the "undersigned." The referenced "undersigned" is 
obviously the maker who received the loan, who was obligated 
to make payments, and who was entitled to notice of default-
-not the guarantors. 
Respondents also overlook that the cases construing 
documents together deal with the same parties to one 
integrated contract. Here, the Park Meadows Note and the 
Guaranty were executed by different parties who took on 
separate obligations. No doubt every guaranty must be read 
with some reference to the primary obligation which is 
guaranteed,4 but it is indisputable that a guaranty is a 
4 In this instance, there is no doubt that the Guaranty was to be read 
with reference to the Racquet Club Note. The Guaranty was attached to che 
Racquet Club Note and specifically guaranteed payment of "this Promissory 
Note . . . ." 
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separate contract creating separate obligations secondary to 
the primary obligation. This general principle is established 
over and over in the cases cited in respondents' brief: 
A guaranty, in its technical sense, is 
collateral to and made independently of, the 
principal contract which it guarantees, and 
the guarantor's liability is secondary rather 
than primary or original. 
Continental Bank & Trust v. Akwa, 58 Wis. 2d 376, 206 N.W.2d 
174, 181 (1973) (citations omitted).5 This principle is 
obvious in the instant case. The Racquet Club Note requires 
notice of default to the primary obligor prior to 
acceleration, but neither the Guaranty nor the Racquet Club 
Note provide for any notice to the guarantors. Moreover, 
there is no language in the Guaranty or the Racquet Club Note 
which is ambiguous to that effect.6 Respondents' argument 
that the guarantors were entitled to notice of default as the 
"undersigned" is simply unsupportable.7 
5 For other cases cited in respondents' brief establishing this rule, see 
Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks. 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E.2d 
899, 902 (1961); Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Rocca. 100 Idaho 228, 596 P.2d 
100, 104 (1979): 
6 The only language in the Guaranty or the Racquet Club Note which even 
mentions notice to the guarantors specifically provides for a waiver of 
notice: "The . . . guarantors . . . waive presentment for payment, 
protest, demand, notice of protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of 
nonpayment . . . ." 
7 Without a claim of notice from the provisions of the Guaranty or the 
Racquet Club Note, or even a tenable claim of ambiguity to that effect, 
respondents' arguments concerning strict construction of ambiguities 
concerning notice are irrelevant. Respondents cannot argue strict 
construction where there is no ambiguous language to strictly construe. 
Likewise, whether there was a waiver of a right to notice is irrelevant 
where there is no right to waive in the first place. 
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Furthermore, the cases cited by respondents which are 
used to imply that notice may be required even where there is 
no express notice provision in a guaranty are misapplied and 
inappropriately quoted to create an illusory rule that exists 
in respondents' brief—but nowhere in the cases cited.8 In 
addition, respondents unsuccessfully attempt to discredit the 
8 Respondents contend that this Court in American Bonding Co. v. Nelson. 
763 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1988), required notice to a surety where the terms 
of the surety's bond did not expressly require such. "Although the bond 
did not expressly require notice, this Court implicitly required notice 
based on the fact that 'the contract of a surety, for hire, is to be 
strictly construed against the surety.'" Respondents' Brief at 48 
(hereinafter Resp. B.) Contrary to respondents' claim, this Court, in 
American Bonding, found that the surety's bond did expressly provide for 
notice based on language contained in the bond, thus finding in accord with 
the general rule. 
Respondents also claim that under the facts of Sherman. Clay & Co. v. 
Turner. 164 Wash. 257, 2 P.2d 688 (1931), "notice of default to the 
guarantors, Dougans and Beckers, was necessary . . . ." Resp. B. at 31. In 
Sherman, the appellants were guarantors of a conditional sales contract to 
be paid in monthly installments. Appellants were the sole incorporators of 
the obligor corporation. The corporation failed to meet the installments 
and an action was brought on the guaranty. The court found that 
appellants' guaranty was absolute. As an absolute guaranty, the court 
found that notice of the principal's default was unnecessary to hold the 
guarantors liable. The court also noted that because appellants were aware 
of the financial condition of the corporation and knew of its default under 
the sales contract, that even if notice were required by the guaranty, such 
notice would have been an idle gesture. The basis of respondents' claim of 
entitlement to notice is that they did not know of the default under the 
Racquet Club Note. Respondents' reliance on Sherman to show that they were 
entitled to notice of default may be correct if notice were required by the 
Guaranty and such notice were not given, but where notice was never 
required in the first place, respondents' analogy lacks a basis. 
In Fife v. Anderson Realty Brokers. Inc. 155 Ga. App. 475, 271 S.E.2d 9 
(1980), respondents attempt to take advantage of an ambiguous portion of 
the opinion which states "Fife urges as he did below, that it was error to 
find that the notice given to appellants as guarantor was sufficient 
compliance with all terms and conditions of the note, and to thereby 
overrule appellant's oral motion to dismiss . . . ." Id. at 10. This 
language purportedly supports respondents' erroneous position that a 
guarantor is entitled to the same notice of default that the maker is 
entitled to under the terms of a promissory note requiring notice to the 
maker only. Notwithstanding the court's language, the court did not even 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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two cases cited by First Interstate in which the respective 
courts rejected arguments that guarantors could infer or 
derive a right to notice of default because the primary 
obligor had such a right in his contract. Respondents attack 
the holding in Western States Leasing Co. v. Adturn, Inc. , 31 
Colo. App. 256, 500 P.2d 1190, (1972), by pointing out (1) 
that the guarantor "defaulted,* and (2) that the guaranty at 
issue was distinguishable because the guaranty was not 
executed within the course of one transaction. First , to 
suggest a default implies that the court granted re l ie f 
without analysis . In fact, as indicated under the caption of 
the case in the Pacific Reporter, the opinion was speci f ical ly 
selected for o f f i c ia l publication indicating that the court 
f e l t i t s analysis was s ignif icant . Second, the guaranty and 
the lease in Adturn were a part of one transaction. The 
guaranty was executed one day after execution of the lease, 
and the guaranty spec i f ica l ly guaranteed payments under the 
lease. The only differences with the facts of this case are 
that the guaranty in Adturn was not physically attached to the 
Footnote continued from previous page, 
address not ice given to the guarantor, but held that the guarantor was not 
obl igated to pay the f u l l accelerated amount because proper no t i c e of 
default prior to acce lerat ing the note had not been given to the maker. 
Final ly , the cases c i t e d in footnote 5 at page 60 of r espondents ' b r i e f 
concern e i ther instances where not ice was required by the express terms of 
the guaranty and not given or where the guaranty was a " c o l l a t e r a l , 
continuing" guaranty for which not ice has been held to be required even 
without an express provis ion in the guaranty. 
- 1 3 -
primary contract and was not executed at exactly the same 
moment in time. These differences are insignificant 
especially in light of respondents' well-developed analysis 
that related instruments concerning one transaction should be 
considered together. 
[W]here two or more instruments are executed by 
the same parties contemporaneously, or at 
different times in the course of the same 
transaction, and concern the same subject 
matter, they will be read and construed 
together so far as determining the respective 
rights and interests of the parties. . . . 
Resp. B. at 40-41 (quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 
Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972)) (emphasis added). 
Respondents' attack on the holding in President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co.. 98 Utah 297, 95 P.2d 736 (1939), is 
similarly invalid. Respondents argue that a quotation 
regarding one specific point in the Court's opinion applies to 
every point addressed by the Court. The quotation from 
Corporation of the President used by respondents provides as 
follows: "Those cases cited by respondents where a personal 
accommodation surety was held fully released are not in 
point." Id. at 741. The language relied upon by First 
Interstate concerned the Court's holding that absent an 
express right to notice of the principal's default in the 
surety's contract, no rights exists and such a right could not 
be supported by virtue of the principal's right to such 
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notice. In the quotation cited by respondents, the Court was 
addressing the very different issue of whether a compensated 
surety was discharged by a breach in the principal's contract. 
Consequently, respondents' use of this language to distinguish 
the entire opinion is disingenuous. 
Respondents' argument that the Beckers and Dougans 
were entitled to notice of default as guarantors must be left 
to rely exclusively on their claim that the Guaranty expressly 
provided for such. Although respondents contend that the 
Guaranty did expressly provide for notice of default, this 
contention is based on the ill-conceived "undersigned" theory 
which should be summarily rejected by this Court. 
Moreover, even if notice were a condition precedent, 
lack of such notice will only discharge a guarantor to the 
extent of prejudice shown. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 
34-38 and cases cited therein (hereinafter App. B.). 
Respondents have not responded to this argument in First 
Interstate's brief (presumably because their is no prejudice) 
except for claiming that a different set of rules applies for 
uncompensated guarantors. As set forth previously, this 
defense is inadequate because, by virtue of their direct 
beneficial relationship with the corporate principal, the 
guarantors are "compensated." 
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B. The Racquet Club Note was Properly Accelerated. 
The guarantors of the Racquet Club Note were p a r t i e s 
to an uncondit ional , absolute guaranty of payments under the 
Racquet Club Note. Accelerat ion was proper making an 
acce lerated payment due, and the guarantors are l i a b l e for the 
f u l l amount of debt under the Racquet Club Note,9 Respondents 
defenses are inadequate. 
1. Notice of defaul t was not required to Park 
City Racquet Club, as or ig ina l maker, or to Becker 
and Doucran, as intermediate a s s i g n e e s . 
Respondents argue, and the d i s t r i c t court found, 
t h a t , pr ior t o a c c e l e r a t i o n , no t i ce of de fau l t was not only 
necessary t o Park Meadows, but a l s o t o Park City Racquet Club, 
as the o r i g i n a l maker, and Becker and Dougan, as intermediate 
as s ignees of the Racquet Club Note. This argument and holding 
i s erroneous in fac t and law. 
As a preliminary matter, the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s holding 
that n o t i c e was required t o Park City Racquet Club creates an 
impossible condit ion precedent. When not i ce of defaul t was 
9 Even i f acce lerat ion were improper, that i s not grounds for d i scharge 
of l i a b i l i t y for the primary obl igor or the guarantors. Case law which has 
addressed t h i s i s sue indicates that guarantors are not completely 
discharged by an unsuccessful attempt at acce lerat ion , but may be 
discharged to the extent of any injury incurred therefrom. See. e . g . , 
Ocean Manor Ltd. v. Lindland. 580 F.2d 194, 198 (5th Ci r . 1978) 
(Uncompensated guarantor of note not discharged where a c t s of c r e d i t o r , 
including premature attempt to acce lerate , did not i nc r ea se g u a r a n t o r ' s 
r i s k or injure him in any s i g n i f i c a n t manner.). 
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given, Park City Racquet Club had already been d i s so lved for 
over four years . 1 0 There was no place of business or 
reg i s t ered agent t o send n o t i c e . Under these circumstances, 
f a i l u r e to g ive not i ce to Park City Racquet Club cannot be 
regarded as a necessary precondit ion t o accelerat ion—no 
not i ce could be g iven. Furthermore, summary judgment that 
Becker and Dougan were e n t i t l e d to not ice was improper as a 
matter of law. Even i f respondents were correct that Becker 
and Dougan, as former ass ignees of the Racquet Club Note, were 
e n t i t l e d to n o t i c e , there was, and s t i l l i s , a s i g n i f i c a n t 
factual question as to whether that ent i t lement was waived by 
Dougan d i r e c t i n g F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e to send further payment 
n o t i c e s to Park Meadows. Respondents' arguments below, and on 
appeal, make c r y s t a l c l ear that t h i s i s a factual dispute 
which should have precluded summary judgment.11 See B i l l 
Brown Realty. Inc. v . Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). 
10 Pursuant to a long outstanding request for p roduct ion of documents and 
j u s t prior to argument of the ir summary judgment motion, the Beckers and 
Dougans be la ted ly produced documents demonstrating t h a t Park City Racquet 
Club was d i sso lved on December 21, 1982. These documents included 
a r t i c l e s of d i s so lu t ion and a c e r t i f i c a t e from the Utah Department of 
Business Regulation cer t i fy ing the d i s so lu t ion . R. 1392-1407. 
11 Both below and on appeal, respondents dispute F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e ' s 
contention that Dougan waived Becker's and Dougan's r i g h t to n o t i c e of 
default by d irec t ing F irs t Inters ta te to send a l l further n o t i c e s to Park 
Meadows. F irs t Inters ta te contended below and now contends t h a t Dougan 
waived any claimed r ight to not ice of defaul t . Respondents contended 
below and now contend that Dougan's d i rec t ive had reference only to 
payment coupons which were supplied by Firs t I n t e r s t a t e to accompany 
monthly payments. This i ssue was not addressed by the d i s t r i c t cour t as 
i t s presence as a disputed material fact in t h i s appeal confirms. 
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These errors need not be corrected, however, because 
the argument that every party in a chain of assignments is 
entitled to notice from the obligor ignores the legal effect 
of successive assignments and, consequently, must be rejected 
by this Court. 
"Bills and notes . . . are contracts, and the 
fundamental rules governing contract law are applicable to the 
determination of the legal questions which arise over such 
instruments." 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills and Notes § 1, at 19 
(1963). One of the fundamental principals of contract law is 
that upon assignment of a right, "the assignor's right to 
performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in part 
and the assignee acquires a right to such performance." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317 (1981). Under the 
Racquet Club Note, First Interstate was initially obligated to 
provide notice of default to Park City Racquet Club. This 
right was transferred by assignment—first to Becker and 
Dougan and then to Park Meadows. Accordingly, upon each 
assignment, the right to First Interstate's notice under the 
Racquet Club Note was extinguished as to the assignors. 
It is axiomatic that an assignment cannot increase 
the duties of an obligor under the contract assigned. First 
Interstate's obligation was to provide notice of default to 
the "undersigned" or the party(ies) with the rights and the 
obligations of the "undersigned." Park Meadows obtained all 
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r i g h t s of the "undersigned" under the Racquet Club Note and 
F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e properly discharged i t s ob l iga t ion by giv ing 
not i ce t o Park Meadows. 
Respondents admit that "[ t ]he general rule i s that 
ass ignees of contracts stand in the shoes of the assignor and 
rece ive a l l the r igh t s under the contract and are subject to 
a l l the dut i e s of the contract" (Resp. B. at 35 ( c i t i n g Firs t 
Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980))) but f a i l 
to understand that only one party can stand in those shoes at 
any one t ime. The express terms of the Racquet Club Note 
required not i ce only to the primary ob l igor . At the time 
F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e performed i t s ob l i ga t ion , that party was Park 
Meadows.12 
In conclusion, summary judgment was improper because 
F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e could not have given not ice to Park City 
Racquet Club, because there was a genuine i s sue of material 
fac t disputed by the p a r t i e s , and because the only l ega l 
12 Respondents asser t that F irs t Inters tate takes an inconsis tent p o s i t i o n 
by claiming that Park City Racquet Club and Becker and Dougan remain 
l i a b l e on the ir obl igat ions under the Racquet Club Note even though they 
did not receive the r ights (not ice of default) thereunder. Contrary to 
respondents' claim, F irs t I n t e r s t a t e ' s pos i t ion i s c o n s i s t e n t and comports 
with we l l - e s tab l i shed law. Absent novation, a debtor remains l i a b l e on an 
assigned debt as a surety under the doctrine of invo lun ta ry su re tysh ip 
The assignee becomes the new principal and the a s s ignor , the s u r e t y . 
Kennedy v. Gr i f f i th . 98 Utah 183, 95 P.2d 752, 754 (1939); United S ta tes 
v . Shafer. 627 F. Supp. 181, 182 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Twomblev v. Wulf. 25S 
Or. 188, 482 P.2d 166, 168-69 (1971). Though Park Ci ty Racquet Club and 
Becker and Dougan would not be l i a b l e as pr inc ipa l s , they would s t i l l he 
subject to secondary l i a b i l i t y based on th i s pr inc ip le of law. They w^re 
not, however, e n t i t l e d to not ice prior to acce lerat ion . 
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obligation to notify under the Racquet Club Note was 
discharged when notice was given to Park Meadows. 
2. First Interstate's notice of default was 
not "defective". 
The express terms of the Racquet Club Note required 
two conditions precedent to acceleration after default: (1) 
that written notice of default be given, and (2) that the 
holder postpone exercise of its option to accelerate for 15 
days following such notice. Both conditions were indisputably 
met by First Interstate: (1) a letter was sent to Park 
Meadows giving notification of default on January 24, 1986; 
and (2) First Interstate did not take action to exercise its 
option to accelerate until February 10, 1986—17 days after 
giving such notice. These facts are not disputed. Rather 
respondents argue, and the district court found, that First 
Interstate's notice of default was "defective." 
The sole defect isolated by respondents below, and on 
appeal, concerns the effect of language in the January 24 
letter threatening legal action: 
The total amount due $27,402.17, must be 
received in our office by February 7, 1986; 
if not, the lender will take the legal 
actions available to them under the terms of 
the loan documents. 
Respondents assert that because this threat allegedly 
miscalculated the 15-day period required before the option to 
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accelerate could be exercised, the notification of default was 
defective. Respondents7 argument is not .that First Interstate 
failed to notify of default, but that the threat of legal 
action in the January 24 letter terminated the cure period 14 
days after notice of default in violation of the terms of the 
Racquet Club Note. Contrary to what respondents contend, the 
threat did not prematurely terminate the cure period or 
otherwise violate the terms of the Racquet Club Note. 
Since the threat of legal action is the sole source 
of defect claimed by respondents, respondents would agree that 
absent the threat of legal action, First Interstate's notice 
of default would have been proper.13 Even with the threat, 
there is logically no reason that the addition of such 
language makes the actual notification of default in the 
January 24 letter any less proper or effective. This Court 
should, therefore, as a preliminary matter find that the 
January 24 letter provided a notice of default. 
This Court should further find that the threat of 
legal action did not prematurely terminate the cure period in 
violation of the terms of the Racquet Club Note. Respondents 
have consciously ignored the effects of section 57-1-31(1) of 
the Utah Code which as a matter of law disposes of their 
13 There was no express requirement in the Racquet Club Note for First 
Interstate to provide any information concerning its intention regarding 
legal action in its notice of default. In fact, notice of any such 
information was expressly waived. 
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argument that the cure period was prematurely terminated. 
F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e , i n i t i a l l y , chose t o forec lose by power of 
s a l e and executed a s ta tutory not i ce of de faul t on February 
10, 1986. Upon f i l i n g of t h i s n o t i c e , the cure period under 
the Racquet Club Note was automatical ly extended by three 
months.14 Thus, respondents' contention that the cure period 
terminated on February 7, 1986, i s m e r i t l e s s . 
Even without the extension of time in s e c t i o n 57 -1 -
31 (1 ) , the cure period would not have terminated u n t i l 
February 10, 1986—when F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e executed the 
s ta tutory no t i ce of de fau l t . I t i s w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d that a 
de fau l t ing party on a note may cure at any time before 
a c c e l e r a t i o n . Optional acce l era t ion c l a u s e s , l i k e the one in 
the Racquet Club Note, are not "se l f - execut ing upon the 
d e f a u l t . " KIXX. Inc. v . S t a l l i o n Music. I n c . . 610 P.2d 1385, 
1388 (Utah 1980). Unt i l the payee, by af f irmat ive ac t , 
e x e r c i s e s the option "the payor has the r ight to remedy the 
14 Respondents' claim that Becker never received a copy of F i r s t 
I n t e r s t a t e ' s s tatutory not ice of default i s e i ther incorrect or 
inconsequential . Al l of the guarantors of the Racquet Club Note, 
including Becker, were given F irs t I n t e r s t a t e ' s s t a t u t o r y n o t i c e of 
default by c e r t i f i e d mail, return rece ipt requested. See Af f idav i t of 
Donn Clarkin and rece ipt s for c e r t i f i e d mail a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as Addendum A 
(R. 1203-1210 & 1276-1283). Furthermore, Becker acknowledges in h i s 
deposi t ion that he had actual knowledge of F irs t I n t e r s t a t e ' s e l e c t i o n to 
forec lose by power of sa le in February 1986. See Deposi t ion of Freder ick 
George Becker II pp. 35 and 47 attached hereto as Addendum B (R. 1525). 
The s tatutory not ice of default was a matter of pub l i c record impar t ing 
addit ional not ice for which Becker should be charged. Thus, respondents 
cannot claim that Becker did not have an opportunity to cure due to lack 
of knowledge of the defaul t . 
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default by tendering payment of the delinquent amount." Id. 
First Interstate7s only affirmative act with regard to 
exercise of its option occurred 17 days after giving notice of 
default when it executed the statutory notice of default 
indicating its intent to exercise its power of sale under the 
trust deed. Thus, at the earliest, the cure period ended on 
February 10, 1986, in full compliance with the terms of the 
Racquet Club Note. 
Finally, argument that the threat of legal action in 
the January 24 letter terminated the cure period on February 
7, 1986, is flawed. To exercise an option to accelerate by 
letter or notice, the holder must use language amounting to a 
clear and unequivocal exercise of that option.15 While First 
Interstate's threat to "take the legal actions available . . . 
under the terms of the loan documents" may have been notice of 
intent to exercise its option to accelerate, it was not notice 
that the option was exercised. 
The court in American Jet Leasing v. Flight America, 
Inc., 537 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Va. 1982), specifically addressed 
whether a threatening letter was sufficient to accelerate a 
debt. The creditor's attorney sent a letter to the debtor 
"demanding payment within seven (7) days or threatening to 
15 Wolflev v. Wooten. 220 Mo. App. 668, 293 S.W. 73 (1927); Union Central 
Life Ins. Co. v. Adams. 169 Okla. 572, 38 P.2d 26 (1934). Cf. Don 
Anderson Enters.. Inc. v. Entertainment Enters.. 589 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. App. 
1979), KIXX. Inc. v. Stallion Music. Inc.. 610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980). 
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'take all such action as we deem advisable to protect our 
client's interest.'" Id. at 748. The court held that the 
letter did not accelerate the note, and thus, the debtor still 
had a right to cure the default after the 7-day period. The 
court remarked as follows: 
Stated generally, the rule is that the 
exercise of the option must be made in a 
manner so clear and unequivocal as to leave 
no doubt as to the holder's intention and to 
appraise the maker effectively of the fact 
that the option has been exercised. [The 
creditor's] letter . . . [was] nothing more 
than a conditional threat that lack[ed] the 
required definiteness and finality. 
Id. at 748-49 (citation omitted).16 The language in the 
January 24 letter is strikingly similar to the language in the 
16 See also Union Central Life Ins. Co, v. Adams. 169 Okla. 572, 38 P.2d 
26 (1934). In Adams, the issue before the court was whether a certain 
letter sent by the holder of a note was sufficient evidence of the 
holder's exercise of its option to accelerate. The letter provided that 
unless amounts presently due under the note were paid by a certain date, 
that "the papers will on that date be forwarded to our local attorney with 
instructions to file suit for foreclosure of the mortgage for collection 
of the entire debt." Id. at 27. Even though the letter indicated in no 
uncertain terms that unless certain sums were received by a certain date 
the holder would accelerate the debt and foreclose, the court held that 
there was 
no language that [could] be construed as amounting to 
a clear and unequivocal exercise of the option to 
accelerate the maturity date of the principal note. . 
. . There [was] no present definite exercise of the 
option, but a mere threat that, unless the delinquent 
items were paid by a certain date, the option would 
be exercised at that time by placing the note and 
mortgage in the hands of an attorney with 
instructions to file foreclosure action for the 
entire debt. 
Id. at 29. The court further stated: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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letter in American Jet Leasing. The January 24 letter states 
that "available actions" will be taken—without even 
specifying what those "available actions" might be. The 
language does not declare the entire amount due presently or 
in the future. At most, the threat of legal action is an 
indication of an intent to accelerate at some time after 
February 7, 1986. Moreover, since the language made clear 
that any actions were conditioned on availability under the 
loan documents, the alleged one-day error would have been 
inconsequential—the language promised not to take any actions 
unless they were available. The Racquet Club Note was not 
accelerated by the January 24 letter and respondents' right to 
cure was not affected. 
In conclusion, notice of default was properly given 
in the January 24 letter, and there is no credible basis for 
concluding that the cure period was terminated prematurely in 
violation of the terms of the Racquet Club Note. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
A mere threat to file suit at some future date for 
the entire amount unaccompanied by a definite 
declaration that the mortgagee had elected to declare 
the whole sum due does not amount to an exercise of 
the option. Such statements and threats leave 
something else to be done before it can be said that 
there has been an actual exercise of the option. 
Id. at 30. 
-25-
Consequently, the only bas is for a "defect" claimed by 
respondents does not exist*17 
IV. BECAUSE THEIR OTHER DEFENSES ARE INSUFFICIENT AS A 
MATTER LAW, FIRST INTERSTATE IS ENTITLED TO PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ESTABLISHING THE LIABILITY OF 
GUARANTORS OF THE RACQUET CLUB NOTE 
Respondents make several desperate factual and legal 
arguments a l legedly excusing the Beckers and Dougans from 
l i a b i l i t y as guarantors on any deficiency. All of 
respondents ' arguments are without meri t . 
A. There Has Been No Impairment of C o l l a t e r a l . 
Respondents se t forth a number of factual grounds 
which purportedly show impairment of the Racquet Club property 
as c o l l a t e r a l for the Racquet Club Note. F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e 
takes exception to a l l of the fac ts al leged in respondents ' 
brief.1 8 However, a de ta i l ed reply concerning those facts i s 
17 Because the Racquet Club Note was not prematurely acce lerated, the 
Court need not determine how to ca lcu la te whether February 7, 1986, was 14 
or 15 days a f ter not ice was given pursuant to the terms of the Racquet 
Club Note. 
18 For example, respondents contend that the p r i o r i t y of the trust deed 
securing the Racquet Club loan was subordinated to cer ta in loans and 
accompanying secur i ty documents in favor of F ir s t Security Bank. Resp. B. 
at 87-89. The Subordination Agreement referred to by respondents did not 
include the Racquet Club loan or the trus t deed securing the Racquet Club 
property as items which were subordinated by the agreement. Furthermore, 
i t i s evident that i f the F irs t Security Bank debt were prior to the trust 
deed securing the Racquet Club property, that debt would have been paid 
prior to any amounts being credited to s a t i s f a c t i o n of the Park Meadows 
loan. Al l proceeds from the sa l e of the Racquet Club property were 
applied to the Racquet Club loan. Respondents' contention in tent iona l ly 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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unnecessary because respondents fail to discuss the only fact 
that is determinative with regard to their defense. That fact 
is that the entire proceeds from the sale of the Racquet Club 
property went to reduce the obligations under the Racquet Club 
Note. With regard to this fact, the determinative principal 
of law is that 
where a creditor's actions impair the value 
of the collateral in his possession which 
secures an obligation guaranteed by a 
guarantor, either absolute or conditional, 
the guarantor will be discharged from this 
obligation to the extent of the impairment. 
Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 
742 P.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). In this case, the entire 
sale proceeds were applied to reduce the obligations evidenced 
by the Racquet Club Note. There was no impairment, and the 
guarantors liability was not extinguished at all. 
One case cited by respondents, Industrial Investment 
Corp. v. Rocca. 100 Idaho 228, 596 P.2d 100 (1979), betrays 
their gross misunderstanding of the foregoing rule. In Rocca, 
the creditor repossessed certain property securing obligations 
of the principal debtor. The proceeds from the sale of the 
security were credited towards those obligations. The 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
disregards both the instrument (Subordination Agreement) and the actual 
facts with respect to their argument. See Subordination Agreement and 
Amendment to Subordination Agreement attached hereto as Addendum C (R. 
1522, Exhibit U). 
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guarantor had no knowledge of the transaction and the security 
was sold without his consent. The court found that, in such a 
situation, the creditor stands in the position of a trustee 
for the guarantor. This trustee relationship allows the 
guarantor to be discharged from his obligation to the extent 
that the creditor causes a loss to occur. The court went on 
to hold that, to the extent the proceeds were applied to 
reduce the debt, the guarantor had suffered no loss and no 
impairment defense was available. 
In this case, the proceeds from the sale were applied 
to reduce the amount of debt. Under these facts, the law is 
clear that no impairment defense is available. 
B. Determination of the Fair Market Value of the 
Racquet Club Property is not Necessary for Partial Summary 
Judgment Establishing Liability of the Guarantors. 
Respondents are correct in asserting that, as of yet, 
First Interstate has produced no evidence of the Racquet Club 
property's fair market value. First Interstate stipulated 
below that the determination of any deficiency would be 
calculated based on the fair market value at the time of 
foreclosure. Though the fair market value of the property is 
a fact which must be resolved by the trial court, respondents 
err by alleging that First Interstate should be precluded from 
partial summary judgment because this issue has not been 
resolved. First Interstate is not seeking a determination of 
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the amount of liability in this proceeding, but is only 
asserting that the guarantors are liable for any amounts 
outstanding on the Racquet Club Note. 
C. First Interstate Did Not Release Enoch Smith or 
Victor Ayers from Obligations Under the Racquet Club Loan, 
Respondents argue that every party liable on the 
Racquet Club Note has been released because First Interstate 
released Enoch Smith and Victor Ayers from personal liability 
on the $800,000 Racquet Club loan evidenced by the Racquet 
Club Note, Contrary to respondents' assertions, neither Enoch 
Smith nor Victor Ayers has been released from liability on 
this particular loan. 
1. Enoch Smith. To support that Enoch Smith 
was released, respondents rely exclusively on paragraph 5 of 
the document entitled "Park Meadows Development and Related 
Entities Workout Agreement with FIUT and FSB" (the "Workout 
Agreement"). See App. B., Addendum B. The specific language 
relied upon states: 
5. Enoch and Margaret Smith will be 
released from whatever personal liability may 
exist on the FSB debt, FIUT's PMD, Enoch 
Smith Company and Smith Park Acres loans and 
the "Ayers" loans. 
As a matter of law, the language in this paragraph 
cannot be construed to release Enoch Smith on the Racquet Club 
loan because it does not purport to be a present release of 
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anything and only re fer s t o r e l e a s e s that w i l l occur in the 
future. The Workout Agreement was executed on June 19, 1985, 
and each prov i s ion , including paragraph 5, v/as an agreement 
between the various p a r t i e s of events that would occur " [a ] t 
the contemplated c l o s i n g . " App B. , Addendum B J 1. The 
r e l e a s e of Enoch Smith was one such event . By i t s e l f 
paragraph 5 i s no more a re l ease of Enoch Smith than i s 
paragraph 4, a blanket mortgage, or paragraph 2, a $1,000,000 
loan from F i r s t Security Bank. Id. K«J 2 , 4 , 5 . In fac t , 18 
c l o s i n g documents were subsequently executed by the p a r t i e s 
(the "Closing Documents") g iv ing e f f e c t to the various mutual 
promises in the Workout Agreement.19 
19 The c lo s ing documents included (1) F irs t Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 
and F i r s t In ters ta te Bank of Utah, N.A. Intercredi tor and Subordinat ion 
Agreement, entered into June 28, 1985; (2) Subordination Agreement, made 
as of June 28, 1985, between F irs t Inters ta te Bank of Utah, N.A. and PMD 
Co. , Enoch Smith J r . , Margaret Smith, Enoch Smith Sons Company, Enoch 
Richard Smith, Enoch Smith Company, and Weaver's Qua l i ty Welding; (3) 
Amendment to Subordination Agreement, dated J u ly 19, 1985 between F i r s t 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. and F ir s t In ters ta te Bank of Utah, N.A.; (4) 
Promissory Note, dated June 28, 1985, $1,000,000.00 from Park Meadows 
Development Co., Margaret Smith, Enoch Richard Smith and Enoch Smith, J r . 
to F i r s t Security Bank or Utah, National Associat ion; (5) $1,000,000.00 
Park Meadows Development Term Loan Agreement, entered into June 28, 198 5, 
between Park Meadows Development Co., Enoch Richard Smith, Enoch Smith, 
J r . , Margaret Smith and F irs t Security Bank of Utah, N.A.; (6) Amendment 
to $1,000,000.00 Park Meadows Development Term Loan Agreement, en te red 
into July 19, 1985, e f f e c t i v e as of June 28, 1985, between Park Meadows 
Investment Co., Enoch Richard Smith, Enoch Smith, J r . , Margaret Smith, and 
F i r s t Security Bank of Utah, N.A.; (7) Trust Deed with Assignment of 
Rents, made June 28, 1985, between Park Meadows Development Co., Enoch 
Smith Company, Enoch Smith, J r . , Enoch Richard Smith and F irs t Secur i ty 
Bank of Utah, N.A.; (8) Amendment to Trust Deed, made July 19, 1985, 
between Park Meadows Investment Co., Enoch Smith Company, Enoch Smith, 
J r . , Enoch Richard Smith, and F ir s t Security Bank of Utah, N.A.; (9) Trust 
Deed with Assignment of Rents, made e f f e c t i v e as of June 28, 1985, between 
Enoch Richard Smith, Enoch Smith, J r . , Margaret Smith and F irs t Secur i ty 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Pursuant to paragraph 5, on July 19, 1985, the 
parties executed a document entitled "Amendment and Extension 
Agreement," effective as of June 28, 1985. App. B. , Addendum 
D. In this agreement, Enoch Smith was released from liability 
• 20 
on several loans from First Interstate to Park Meadows, but 
not on the $800,000 Racquet Club loan. Thus, though Enoch 
Smith was released from TIUT's PMD . . . loans" as promised 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Bank of Utah, N.A.; (10) Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, made 
effective as of June 28, 1985, between Enoch Smith, Jr., Margaret Smith 
and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.; (11) Trust Deed with Assignment of 
Rents, made effective as of June 28, 1985, between Enoch Smith, Jr., 
Margaret Smith and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.; (12) Mortgage with 
Assignment of Rents, made effective as of June 28, 1985, between Enoch 
Smith, Jr., Margaret Smith and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.; (13) 
Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, made effective as of June 28, 1985, 
between Enoch Richard Smith, Enoch Smith, Jr., Margaret Smith, and First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A.; (14) Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, 
made effective as of June 28, 1985, between Park Meadows Investment Co., 
Enoch Richard Smith, Enoch Smith, Jr., Margaret Smith, and First 
Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A.; (15) Supplemental Security Agreement, 
effective as of June 28, 1985, between Park Meadows Investment Co., Enoch 
Richard Smith, Enoch Smith, Jr., Margaret Smith, and First Security Bank 
of Utah, N.A.; (16) Loan Amendment and Extension Agreement, effective as 
of June 28, 1985, between Park Meadows Investment Company, Enoch Richard 
Smith, Enoch Smith, Jr., Margaret Smith, and First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A.; (17) Financing Statements, numbers 027950-027953, filed pursuant to 
the Uniform Commercial Code; and (18) Amendment and Extension Agreement, 
entered into, effective as of June 28, 1985, between Park Meadows 
Investment Co., Enoch Richard Smith, Enoch Smith, Jr., Margaret Smith, 
Enoch Smith Co., Enoch Smith Sons Co., Weaver's Quality Welding, and First 
Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. 
20 At the time of the Workout Agreement, Park Meadows owed First 
Interstate on two secured loans and three unsecured loans for development 
of the Park Meadows Golf Course. First Interstate contends that these 
were the loans which were to be released pursuant to paragraph 5 of the 
Workout Agreement. These loans were in fact released under the Amendment 
and Extension Agreement. 
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in the Workout Agreement, i t i s c l e a r that the p a r t i e s did not 
contemplate the $800,000 Racquet Club loan as one of them.21 
Under these f a c t s , t h i s Court may determine that the 
Workout Agreement merged with the Closing Documents, Mawhinney 
v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769, 744 (1951), or that the 
Workout Agreement must be read and construed with reference to 
the Closing Documents because they are re la ted documents 
concerning one transact ion , Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v . Lentz. 28 
Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972). The theory i s 
unimportant because the promise t o r e l e a s e Enoch Smith in the 
Workout Agreement was f u l f i l l e d by or, in the a l t e r n a t i v e , 
defined by the s p e c i f i c r e l e a s e s described in the Closing 
Documents, none of which included a r e l e a s e on the $800,000 
Racquet Club loan. 
2. Victor Ayers. In further e f f o r t to show F ir s t 
I n t e r s t a t e i s not e n t i t l e d to p a r t i a l summary judgment, 
respondents a l s o a l l e g e , in conclusory fashion, that Victor 
Ayers was re leased from personal l i a b i l i t y on the Racquet Club 
21 In addit ion, the re leases in the Amendment and Extension Agreement 
express ly reserved r ights against "any other persons, e n t i t i e s , or p a r t i e s 
obl igated on the loans . . . ." App. B. , Addendum D, at 7. This language 
ind icates that any re lease by F ir s t In ters ta te would have included t h i s 
reservat ion, and arguably should be applied to any purported r e l e a s e by 
v i r t u e of the Workout Agreement based on r e sponden t s ' wel l -developed ru le 
that the terms of re la ted documents should be cons t rued t o g e t h e r . Had a 
re lease been intended and expected with respect to the Racquet Club loan, 
respondents would have no argument that Park Meadows or any of i t s 
partners were re leased because such a reservat ion p r e se rve s a l l r i g h t s 
against co -ob l igors . See Dodson v. Continental Supply Co. . 175 Okla. 587, 
53 P.2d 582 (1935). 
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loan pursuant to a separate workout arrangement with First 
Interstate. Resp. B. at 77. The Beckers and Dougans made a 
similar conclusory allegation in their amended memorandum in 
opposition to First Interstate's September 26, 1988, motion 
for partial summary judgment. R. 1522, p.31. Respondents do 
not support their allegation in their brief with specific 
citation to the record, and the only factual support below is 
the affidavit of Victor Ayers attached to the Beckers7 and 
Dougans' amended memorandum. See Affidavit of Victor Ayers 
attached hereto as Addendum D (R. 1522, Exhibit A). 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires more than conclusory allegations in pleadings, 
memoranda, or briefs to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 
Rather, an adverse party is required to set forth specific 
facts by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 to show 
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e). Absent affidavits or other evidence, it is well-
settled that conclusory allegations, such as those made by 
respondents concerning Ayers' release, are insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment. See Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 
224 (Utah 1983). However, just because respondents have an 
affidavit to rely on does not necessarily raise an issue of 
22 First Interstate submitted written arguments (R. 866-67) in its reply 
memorandum as well as oral arguments before the district court (R. 1533, 
p.40) that Ayers' affidavit was inadmissible and ineffective to raise an 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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An affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible in 
evidence. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("supporting and opposing 
affidavits . . . shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence . . . . " ) . If an affidavit sets forth 
inadmissible facts, those facts may not be considered in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Norton v. 
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). Ayers' affidavit 
contains two paragraphs concerning First Interstate#s alleged 
release. Paragraph 5 purportedly describes the terms of a 
1983 written workout agreement between Ayers and First 
Interstate whereby Ayers claims he was released from a 
$3,721,975.00 personal obligation and additional personal 
obligations, including the Racquet Club loan, for a pledge of 
his equity in Park Meadows. Paragraph 6 merely states that he 
"understood and believed from 1983" that he was released from 
any liability on the Racquet Club loan pursuant to the workout 
agreement. 
These conclusory recitations are inadmissible as 
evidence and, therefore, ineffective to raise an issue of fact 
precluding summary judgment for at least two reasons. First, 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
issue of fact. Although the district court did not specifically address 
First Interstate's arguments, it held generally that issues of material 
fact precluded First Interstate's motion for partial summary judgment. R. 
1533, p.49. 
34 
the affidavit purports to set forth the terms of a written 
workout agreement without quoting its terms or producing an 
original or duplicate of the written instrument. Absent a 
showing of special circumstances, Utah law mandates that the 
only admissible evidence setting forth the terms and contents 
of a writing is the writing itself. Utah R. Evid. 1002 ("To 
prove the content of a writing . . . the original writing . . 
. is required . . . . " ) ; Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-16 (1987) 
("There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other 
than the writing itself . . . . " ) . Second, even if Ayers' 
affidavit were not totally barred by the above-cited law, the 
parole evidence rule bars any facts set forth as evidence 
which seek to explain or vary the terms of a written agreement 
without establishing a proper foundation for introduction of 
such evidence and without establishing that the written 
workout agreement is ambiguous. See Norton v. Blackham. 669 
P.2d at 859; see also Rainford v. Rvttinq, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 
P.2d 769, 770-71 (1969). 
Even assuming the statements in Ayers7 affidavit were 
admissible as evidence, Becker and Dougan cannot raise an 
issue of fact by submitting a party's affidavit which is 
contradicted by that party's own prior statements. See 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983) (party may 
not raise issue of fact by affidavit where contradicted by 
party's prior inconsistent statement). First Interstate sued 
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Ayers along with the other guarantors of the Racquet Club Note 
for any deficiencies resulting from foreclosure of the Racquet 
Club property. R. 1-28. Though Ayers', in his affidavit, 
claims that he "understood and believed from 1983" that he was 
released from any liability on the Racquet Club loan, Ayers 
failed to assert that affirmative defense in his answer filed 
in 1987. R. 92-101. Such omission, in light of the 
obligatory pleading requirements concerning affirmative 
defenses in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
equivalent to a statement that Ayers did not understand or 
believe that he was released from liability on the Racquet 
Club loan at the time his answer was filed. 
First Interstate did not release Ayers from personal 
liability on the Racquet Club Note, and respondents cannot 
create an issue of fact with conclusory allegations. Ayers' 
affidavit does not provide factual support necessary to 
substantiate respondents' allegations—it contradicts his 
prior statements and does not set forth facts that would be 
admissible as evidence. Consequently, as a matter of law, 
respondents have failed to raise a genuine issue of fact 
precluding First Interstate's motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
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D. Release of a Partner Does Not Release the 
Partnership, 
There has been no re l ease of a Park Meadows partner 
from any ob l iga t ion ar i s ing from the Racquet Club loan; but, 
even assuming F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e had re leased a Park Meadows 
partner from personal l i a b i l i t y on the Racquet Club loan, 
r e l ease of a partner does not neces sar i l y c o n s t i t u t e a re lease 
of the partnership. 
Respondents re ly on one pre-Utah Uniform Partnership 
Act case , Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co. v . Lunt. 46 Utah 299, 
151 P. 521 (1915),2 3 for support that re l ease of a partner 
from partnership l i a b i l i t y r e l e a s e s the partnership. This 
case i s unpersuasive for the proposi t ion asserted by 
respondents. 
F i r s t , the quotation used by respondents was d ic ta 
and ind ica te s only that a re l ease of one or more partners 
operates as a r e l ease of the other partners from such 
l i a b i l i t y , not the partnership. Second, because the case was 
decided before adoption of the Utah Uniform Partnership Act, 
23 Respondents a l so c i t e to Pal le v. Industrial Commission of Utah 79 Utah 
47, 7 P.2d 284 (Utah 1932), and F irs t Security Bank v. Feleer. 658 F. 
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987), in developing t h i s argument. These cases , 
however, do not support respondents' argument. The court in Palle held 
that for cer ta in partnership ob l iga t ions , a p l a i n t i f f must sue the 
partnership rather than the individual dealing on behalf of the 
partnership. The court in Felger merely held that a general partner in a 
l imi ted partnership i s personally l i a b l e for partnership debts. Neither 
of these case shows how, under Utah law, the re lease of a partner re leases 
the partnership. 
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any a n a l y s i s of t h i s i s sue must be determined with reference 
t o i t s p r o v i s i o n s . Under t h i s Act, a partnership i s treated 
as a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y . 2 4 Moreover, with respect t o 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of partnership debts , personal l i a b i l i t y of 
partners i s contingent on, and secondary t o , exhaustion of 
partnership a s s e t s . See McCune & McCune v . Mountain Bel l 
T e l . , 758 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1988). 
Consequently, the re l ease of a partner from personal, 
"secondary" l i a b i l i t y does not re l ease the partnership which 
i s primarily l i a b l e as an e n t i t y . 
E. Even i f Park Meadows Were Released, the 
Indemnity Agreement Precludes the Release of the Beckers and 
Douaans as Guarantors. 
Respondents f a i l t o adequately respond to the fact 
noted in F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e ' s br i e f that * [ i ] n the few cases 
that have ar i s en , i t has been held that a r e l e a s e of the 
pr inc ipa l does not discharge a surety i f he i s indemnified." 
App. B. at 42 (quoting L. Simpson, Handbook on the Law of 
Suretyship 304 (1950) ) . Respondents are correct that 
Simpson's Handbook c i t e s to po l i cy cons iderat ions in the 
24 For example: A partnership may own property in i t s own name, Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-1-5 (1989); partnership a s s e t s cannot be used to s a t i s f y a 
partner's personal ob l igat ions without a charging order, Utah Code Ann. § 
48-1-25 (1989); a partner has no r ight to possess partnership p roper ty 
except for partnership use, Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-11(2) (a ) (1989); and, 
upon d i s s o l u t i o n , partners are only indiv idual ly l i a b l e for p a r t n e r s h i p 
debts a f ter partnership property i s exhausted, Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 7 
(1989) . 
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Restatement which urge that an indemnified s u r e t y ' s l i a b i l i t y 
be l imi ted t o an accounting for the secur i ty . 2 3 However, t h a t 
does not change the fac t that the few courts which have 
a c t u a l l y addressed t h i s i s sue have held that indemnified 
s u r e t i e s are not re leased upon the re l ease of a p r i n c i p a l . At 
any r a t e , any po l i cy considerat ions in t h i s case weigh heav i ly 
in keeping with the decided cases that indemnified s u r e t i e s 
remain l i a b l e . 
Clearly any r i s k s ar i s ing from the transfer of t he 
Racquet Club property and accompanying debt i n s t rumen t s should 
be borne by Becker and Dougan. They, not F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e , 
s e l e c t e d Park Meadows as the purchaser of the Racquet Club 
property and as ass ignee of the Racquet Club Note. To p r o t e c t 
themselves from any l i a b i l i t y on the Racquet Club Note, Becker 
and Dougan obtained an indemnification agreement26 from Park 
Meadows and i t s partners . They were aware i f Park Meadows 
f a i l e d t o perform, they would have t o perform. Park Meadows 
25 Contrary to respondents' br ief , th i s Court did not adopt the po l i cy 
found in comment c of s ec t ion 122 of the Restatement of Security in Horman 
v. Gordon. 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App. 1987). Rather, t h i s Court merely 
adopted the general rule of s ec t ion 122 that an unqualif ied r e l e a s e of a 
principal re l eases the surety. Furthermore, respondents' s ta tement that: 
the court in Continental Bank & Trust v. Akwa. 58 Wis. 2d 376, 206 N.W 2d 
174, (1973), addressed "the s p e c i f i c i ssue of the indemnified su re ty" is 
wrong--the court did not address the issue anywhere in i t s opin ion . 
26 Respondents' further asser t ion that the word " s e c u r i t y " does not 
include the type of indemnity agreement given the Beckers and Dougans by 
the Park Meadows partners i s flawed. There simply i s no b a s i s for 
claiming that "security" for purposes of an indemnified surety means 
s o l e l y tangible property. 
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has failed to perform. Who should now bear the loss—First 
Interstate, who dealt with Park City Racquet Club and extended 
credit on the basis of the Beckers', Dougans', and Ayers' 
guaranty—or Becker and Dougan, who dealt with Park Meadows 
and its partners, all of whom entered into an indemnity 
agreement on their behalf? Clearly, the answer is Becker and 
Dougan. The risk belongs with Becker and Dougan and, in this 
case, policy dictates that even if the principal on the 
Racquet Club Note were released, that the risks and 
liabilities remain with Becker and Dougan as indemnified 
sureties. 
VI. THE DEPOSITIONS EXPENSES CLAIMED BY THE BECKERS AND 
DOUGANS CANNOT BE RECOVERED AS "COSTS" UNDER RULE 
54(d)(2) 
Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a prevailing party, upon proper application, may 
obtain an award of costs "necessarily incurred in the action 
or proceeding." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Respondents 
contend that the costs of 12 depositions, briefly described at 
pages 64-65 of their brief, meet this standard. However, 
respondents' contention does not comport with well-established 
law regarding allowance of deposition costs under Rule 
54(d)(2). If this Court affirms the district court's order, 
this Court should, therefore, reverse the district court's 
award of costs. 
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Respondents seek an overboard interpretation of the 
Utah Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of when costs for 
depositions are "essential" and "necessary" for the 
development and presentation of a case. The Utah Supreme 
Court's holdings in Nelson v, Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 
1978), and Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific 
Railroad, 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), leave no question that 
the costs claimed by respondents are not allowable. In both 
cases, the Utah Supreme Court required that depositions 
actually be used in the proceedings as a condition precedent 
to an award of costs. In Nelson, the Court refused to allow 
deposition costs because the depositions were not used during 
the course of the trial. Nelson, 582 P.2d at 604. In 
Highland, the Court was persuaded to allow deposition costs 
because "the depositions were used at trial on cross-
examination, both to impeach veracity and to refresh memory." 
Highland, 683 P.2d at 1052. 
Of course, in the Beckers' and Dougans' summary 
judgment motion, there was no trial in which to use the 
depositions. But, it is evident from the Beckers' and 
Dougans' supporting memoranda that none of the 12 depositions 
were necessary or even used to support the arguments upon 
which they prevailed. Their arguments were entirely based on 
facts relating to the notice of default which were available 
from the beginning of the case. The Beckers and Dougans did 
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not need a s i n g l e depos i t ion t o e s t a b l i s h the f a c t s needed to 
preva i l on t h e i r arguments. This i s evidenced by t h e i r 
supporting memoranda which, in t o t a l , contained references to 
three depos i t ions (only two of which are included in t h e i r 
request for c o s t s — J . Lynn Dougan and Frederick G. Becker I I ) . 
The references were used t o e s t a b l i s h f a c t s that were 
undisputed by F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e , which were supported by other 
sources , which could have been a l l eged by a f f i d a v i t , or which 
could have been e s tab l i shed by o t h e r - l e s s expensive means of 
discovery. 2 7 Thus, even under a l i b e r a l in terpre ta t ion of the 
Utah Supreme Court's holding, the claimed c o s t s of respondents 
should be d isa l lowed. 
27 In Defendant Beckers' and Dougans' Memorandum of Points and Authorit ies 
in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment, the deposi t ion of 
Frederick G. Becker II was referenced at pages 3, 4, 13, and 42 to 
e s t a b l i s h that F i r s t In ters ta te did not provide not ice of default to the 
Beckers and, further, that no statutory not ice of default was ever 
received by the Beckers. The deposi t ion of J. Lynn Dougan was referenced 
at pages 3 and 42 to e s t a b l i s h that the Dougans were not given not ice of 
de fau l t . 
In Defendants Dougans' and Beckers' Reply Memorandum and Memorandum 
Opposing P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Part ia l Summary Judgment, the deposit ion 
of Enoch Richard Smith was referenced at pages 3 and 13 to e s t a b l i s h that 
Enoch Smith, Enoch Richard Smith, and Victor Ayers agreed to assume the 
Racquet Club Note. Each reference a l so included addit ional support for 
t h i s a l l e g a t i o n c i t i n g to the responses to admissions from "PMD, Smiths, 
and Ayers" and the "V.R. Ayers Af f idav i t ." The depos i t ion of J. Lynn 
Dougan i s referenced at pages 4-5 and 24 to e s t a b l i s h that the not ices 
d irected to be sent to Park Meadows by J. Lynn Dougan did not include 
not i ce of defaul t . 
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CONCLUSION 
As set forth in appellant's opening brief, 
respondents borrowed money and guaranteed the payment of that 
money to First Interstate for their own business endeavors 
which went sour. They now seek to avoid payment of that 
solemn obligation on the sheerest and most insubstantial 
technicalities—technicalities that the precedent they cite do 
not acknowledge as sufficient to relieve these parties from 
their legitimate obligations. This court as a court of 
justice should reverse the summary judgment of the district 
court and hold that the guarantors of the Racquet Club Note 
are liable for the accelerated payment due thereunder. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z^^day of May, 1990. 
HOLME /ROBERTS & OWEN 
iU~~~ 
Richie D. Haddock 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides: 
Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-16 provides: 
There can be no evidence of the contents of a 
writing, other than the writing itself, except in the 
following cases: 
(1) when the original has been lost or 
destroyed, in which case proof of the loss or 
destruction must first be made. 
(2) when the original is in the possession of 
the party against whom the evidence is offered and he 
fails to produce it after reasonable notice. 
(3) when the original is a record or other 
document in the custody of a public officer. 
(4) when the original has been recorded, and 
the record or a certified copy thereof is made 
evidence by this code or other statue. 
(5) when the original consists of numerous 
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined 
in court without great loss of time, and the evidence 
sought from them is only the general result of the 
whole. 
Statutes and Rules-i 
Provided , however, if any business, 
institution, member of a profession or calling, or 
any department or agency of government, in the 
regular course of business or activity has kept or 
recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, 
representation or combination thereof, of any act, 
transaction, occurrence or event, and in the regular 
course of business has caused any or all of the same 
to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any 
photographic, photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, 
miniature photographic, or other process which 
accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for 
so reproducing the original, the original may be 
destroyed in the regular course of business unless 
its preservation is required by law; and such 
reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as 
admissible in evidence as the original itself in any 
judicial or administrative proceedings whether the 
original is in existence or not, an enlargement or 
facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible 
in evidence if the original reproduction is in 
existence and available for inspection under 
direction of court• The introduction of a reproduced 
record, enlargement or facsimile, does not preclude 
admission of the original. 
In the cases mentioned in Subdivision (3) and 
(4), a copy of the original, or of the record, must 
be produced; in those mentioned in Subdivisions (1) 
and (2), either a copy or oral evidence of the 
contents. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 1002 provides: 
Requirement of original. To prove the content 
of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original 
writing, recording, or photograph is required, except 
as otherwise provided in these rules or by other 
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or 
by Statute. 
ASAD/AE9 
Statutes and Rules-ii 
Tab A 
Mary Anna Q. Wood 
Richard G. Wilkins 
Richia Haddock 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Attomays for Plaintiff 
First Intarstata Bank 
of Utah, N.A. 
50 South Main Straat 
Salt Laka City, Utah 84144 
Telaphona: (301) 521-5800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT 
CO., a Utah partnarship, at al., 
Dafandants. 
FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, at al., 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., at al., 
Third Party Dafandants. 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., at al., 
Third Party Dafandants, 
v. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BAMK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONN CLARKIM. 
V^Uif 
Civil NO. 9159 
Judga J. Dannis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
I, Donn Clarkin, being duly sworn* state as follows: 
1. I am an Assistant vice President in the Loan 
Recovery Department of First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. 
("First Interstate*). 
2. Among my responsibilities as an Assistant vice 
President is administration and oversight of problem loans. 
One of the problem loans over which I had responsibility was 
an $800,000 loan made by First Interstate's predecessor, 
Walker Bank, to Park City Racquet Club in 1973 (the "Racquet 
Club Loan")• 
3. From January 19, 1986, until sometime after June 
of 1986 I was involved in the administration and attempts to 
collect the Racquet Club Loan. 
4. First Interstate employees involved in loan 
administration generate various records in the ordinary course 
of their business. 
5. One of the records regularly generated by First 
Interstate employees when a loan goes into default is a list 
of persons to whom the notice of default is mailed, together 
with copies of the Receipts for Certified Mail for each notice 
of default mailed (such records are referred to hereinafter as 
"Mailing Lists*)• 
6. Mailing Lists are prepared at or near the time 
First Interstate Employees mail notices of default by the 
- 2 -
First Interstate employee or employees who mailed those 
notices of default. 
7. Mailing Lists are kept in First Interstate's 
files as a matter of course. 
8. On February 21, 1986, I mailed notices of 
default on the Racquet Club Loan to various parties. At or 
near the time I mailed those notices of default I prepared the 
Mailing List, a true and correct copy of which is hereto 
attached as a record of that mailing. The "DC* typed on each 
of the Receipts of Certified Mail is my initials. I placed 
that Mailing List in First Interstate's Racquet Club Loan 
file. 
10. The Mailing List attached hereto indicates that 
on February 21, 1986, I mailed Notices of Default relating to 
the Racquet Club Loan to numerous persons, including J. Lynn 
Dougan, Diana Lady Dougan, Frederick G. Becker, II, Margaret 
M. Becker and the Park City Racquet Club. 
Donn Clarkin 
Park City Raqutt Club 
Sorrowers and/or Guarantors and Participants 
Park City Racquet Club 
1200 Little Kate Road 
Park City, Utah 34060 ' 
Park Meadows Development Company 
XEnoch Smith, Jr. 
1441 Seek Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 -
Park Meadows, Inc. 
SEnoch Smith, Jr. 
1441 3eck Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34116 
Enoch Smith, Jr. 
1441 Seek Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Enoch Richard Smith 
1441 Beck Street 
Salt ^ake City, Utah 84116 
Victor 3. Ayers 
*,Gumo & Ayers Real Estate 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Marion P. Ayers 
XGump i Ayers Real Estate 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
J. Lynn Oougan 
iOougan I Associates 
2120 South 1300 East 
Suite #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
First Security Bank 
79 South Main 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Attn*. Ed Davia 
Douglaa Matsuaori-Atty. 
79 S. Main, 14th Floor 
SLC, Utah 84111 
01 ana Lady Oougan 
XOou'gan S Associates 
2120 South 1300 East 
Suite #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34106 
Frederick G. Becker, II 
%8ecker Associates 
1066 West Hedding Street 
San Jose, California 95125 
Margaret M. Becker 
1066 West Hedding Street 
San Jose, California 95125 
Ralph Nielsen 
SFirst Federal Savings S Loan 
505 East 200 Soutn 
Salt Lake City, Utah •- »: 
Georgia Thomas 
XSurety Life Insurance Co. 
P.O. Box 30030 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34130 • 
Michael J. Sell 
First Interstate Mortgage Company 
55 Madison 
Oenver, CO 80206 
Park City Racquet Club 
Highway 248 
Park City, Utah 84060 / 
Mountain Venturaa 
Little Kate Road 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OP UTAH, 
N.A., a Utah corporation, 
P L a i n t L f f 
V3 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., 
a,< i PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT 
CD., a Utah partnership, et al , 
Defendants. 
FREDERICK G. BECXER II, et al., 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., and 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, 
Third-Party Defendants 
:*vil No. 9159 
DEPOSITION OF FREDERICK GEORGE BECKER II 
ii, 4, I *R9 
Reported by SUSAN WILCOX KINGSBURY, CSR, RPf 
Utah CSR Ucewet M. CeMomla CSR UC«AM 27S 
tfin^Sugandysotiate Certified Shorthand Reporter! 
" 3 tMI 400 Sow*. Sw«» 1000 (lODMO-fWi 
S«NUfctCtty.Ule*M111 
i j Q Let me get this straight. 
2 He said Bob Ward said for who to stop making 
3 payments? 
4 I A Dick Smith. 
5 | Bob Ward said to Dick Smith "Don't make any more 
6 payments on the racquet club loan." 
7 i Q This would have been early '87? 
8 | A No. I think it was late '86. 
t 
9 ! Q Late '86? 
10 | A Right. 
11 Now, that led me — That was late '86. 
12 j That led me to believe that the bank and all the 
t 
13 I various parties to this thing were working out some — some 
i 
14 I kind of an agreement to go forward and do all that kind of 
15 ; business. Until that time funds had been brought forth by the 
16 i various lending institutions to allow the service of the debt, 
17 | to allow all those things to happen. 
18 j I said "Wait a minute. That doesn't sound right." 
19 And he said "Well, I guess it's okay." 
20 j Then I said "Well, if the bank is telling you not 
21 { to make payments on a loan* this shouldn't be a problem." 
i 
22 I Then Lynn calls me in early '87, in February, and 
23 i said "The bank's foreclosing on the racquet club*" 
i 
24 I Q Now* Dick's precise words were "Bob Hard said for 
25 i me — for Park Meadows not to make any more payments"? 
Cfrtlnoo Sftortnono w#oortw% 3 5 
We would have done it in a minute, In a New York: 
minute* 
I just don't understand that. 
Q You say that neither you nor Lynn, to your 
know led le, ever received a call from the bank saying that 
payments had been missed? 
A Never. 
Q So you had no knowledge that there was any 
difficulty Miere until December of '86 when you had this 
conversation with Dick Smith; is that correct? 
A When the lank said — When he reported to me that 
the bank told him to stop making payments on the racquet club. 
My jssyinpHi nn \\ the M m * W A H »!• «» ...ihinile deal 1 s gotten worked 
out, everything is fine, whatever 1a going to be done is going 
t O b e ("lOi'lf;1 » 
Then the next thing I know is -
M in1 HANNI M i . Beck(B11 y o u ' k e e p t a l k i i iq about December 
think you're off a year. December of '85? 
-< • i i)ec:!ieiiii,)€i of l 8 S » 
Q (By Ms. Wood) So this conversation occurred in 
DecernbeL ml B"!i And the f I, r el: you understood that Dick Smith 
was in financial difficulty was that phone call you got in 
December of ' 85? 




This Subordination Agreement ("Agreement") is oadu as of 
this 2 * ^ day of June 198J>_, by and between First Interstate Bank 
of Utah, N. A. ("Subordinator"), First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 
("Beneficiary"), and Park Meadows Development Co., a partnership 
(hereinafter "PMD"), Enoch Smith, Jr., Margaret Smith, Enoch Smith 
Sons Company, Enoch Richard Smith, Enoch Smith Company, and 
Weaver's Quality Welding ("Debtors'1). 
RECITALS 
... Debtor, PMD (including its general partners) is 
currently indebted to Subordinator in the aggregate principal 
amount of Four Million Four Hundred Eleven Thousand Dollars 
(f4,411,000.00) by reason of certain debt instruments (notes or 
agreements, as extended and amended) (the "Subordinated Debt 
Instruments"). The Subordinated Debt Instruments, all other 
existing obligations of the Debtors or any of them, to 
Subordinator as set forth in the attached EXHIBIT A (incorporated 
herein by this reference), and all future obligations of Debtors 
to Subordinator created after the date of this Agreement are 
hereafter referred to as the "Junior Debt." 
B Debtors1 repayment of the Subordinated Debt 
Instruments is secured by tl»-*«curity interests granted to 
Subordinator in certain real.property (the "Collateral") by virtue 
of those certain agreements and instruments set forth and 
described in EXHIBIT B hereto (the "Subordinated Collateral 
Documents"). Subordinator's security interests in the Collateral 
are perfected by the filing/recording of the Collateral Documents 
as described in said EXHIBIT B. The Collateral is described in 
EXHIBIT B-l hereto. (EXHIBITS B and B-l are, by these references, 
incorporated herein). ~ 
C. Certain of the Debtors, Beneficiary and Subordinator 
have, prior to this Agreement, executed a certain "Park Meadows 
Development and Related Entities: Workout Arrangement with FIUT 
and FSB", which shall be hereinafter referred to as the 
"Arrangement Agreement", a copy of which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by this reference as EXHIBIT C. The Debtors 
are obligated under loans from Beneficiary as more fully described 
in EXHIBIT D which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
this reference. Under the terms of the Arrangement Agreement, 
Beneficiary commits and agrees to provide certain credit 
accommodations, releases and extensions (including the dismissal 
of certain lawsuits against the Debtors with respect to the loans 
of the Beneficiary), all of which have or will provide substantial 
benefit to Debtors and to Subordinator (including the provision of 
132S9 
additional credit which will flow to Subordinator and the 
provision of additional collateral for loans of Subordinator). As 
a condition to the said agreements by the Beneficiary, however. 
Beneficiary is requiring a full and complete subordination by 
Subordinator of the Subordinated Debt Instruments and the 
Subordinated Collateral Documents and any payments thereunder to 
the new $1,000,000.00 loan being made to PMD (the "Operating 
Loan") and to the loan described on EXHIBIT D as the "PMD Loan". 
(The $1,000,000.00 Loan and Beneficiary's PMD Loan are hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the "Senior Debt".) 
D. Subordinator acknowledges that the Operating Loan of 
the Beneficiary to Debtors is in Subordinator's best business 
interest and that the other accommodations by Beneficiary under 
the Arrangement Agreement provide material and substantial 
economic advantage and benefit to Subordinator. 
E. As an inducement to Beneficiaxy to make the Operating 
Loan and to complete the accommodations and agreements of the 
Arrangement Agreement, Subordinator has agreed to subordinate, in 
the manner and to the extent herein set forth, the payment of the 
Junior Debt and the lien of the Subordinated Collateral Documents 
to the due and punctual payment by Debtors of the Operating Loan 
and the PMD Loan of Beneficiary and to the liens and security 
interests securing the same. 
F. Debtors hereby acknowledge the subordination herein 
by Subordinator and agrees that Debtors will not remit any sums to 
Subordinator for payment of the Junior Debt until the Senior Debt 
has been paid in full and all obligations under the Senior Debt 
have been satisfied in full. 
G. The parties hereto acknowledge that the subordination 
of the Junior Debt as outlined herein will benefit all of the 
parties hereto. 
NOW THEREFORE; in consideration o£ the reasons set forth 
above and the mutual covenants and promises of the parties hereto, 
the parties agree and covenant as follows: 
1. Subordination. Subordinator, for itself, its 
successors and assigns, covenants and agrees that Debtors' payment 
of the Junior Debt is hereby expressly subordinated, to the extent 
and in the manner hereinafter set forth, to the payment of the 
Senior Debt. 
2. Subordination of Subordinator's Interest in the 
Gollatreral. Subordinator hereby consents to Debtors' grant to 
Beneficiary of security interests in the Collateral, and further 
-2-
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agrees that Subordinator's security interests in the Collateral 
are hereby expressly* subordinated to and are junior to the 
Beneficiary's security interests in the Collateral for all of the 
Senior Debt. Specifically, Subordinator subordinates the lien and 
security interest of the Subordinated Collateral Documents in the 
property described in EXHIBIT B-l fully and completely to the lien 
and security interest of the collateral documents described in 
EXHIBIT E hereto (incorporated herein by this reference) and will 
hereafter subordinate the Subordinated Collateral Documents as 
existing (as amended hereafter) to any additional collateral 
documents executed to secure the Senior Debt. Subordinator agrees 
further, that all security interests and liens in any property or 
asset, securing the Junior Debt, whether now existing or hereafter 
created shall be subordinate to all security interests and liens 
in the same property or assets, securing the Senior Debt. 
Subordinator agrees to provide and execute any documents necessary 
to effectuate the subordination of its security interests in the 
Collateral and in any property or assets hereafter constituting 
collateral for both, tbe Junior Debt and the Senior Debt-
3. Payments. Subject to the provisions of the 
Intercreditor Agreement (executed on even date herewith between 
Beneficiary and Subordinator) a copy of which is attached hereto 
as EXHIBIT F, no payments shall be made on the Junior Debt except 
as disbursed by Beneficiary pursuant to the provisions therefor in 
the Arrangement Agreement and the said Intercreditor Agreement. 
Until full satisfaction and payment of the Senior Debt, any 
payments from Debtors, or any of them, or on their behalf, 
received by Subordinator with respect to the Junior Debt, shall be 
constructively received for Beneficiary (subject to a constructive 
trust in favor of Beneficiary) and shall be paid over to 
Beneficiary by Subordinator immediately to be applied in 
accordance with the Intercreditor Agreement and the Arrangement 
Agreement. 
4. No Collections. Until the Senior Debt shall be fully 
paid and satisfied, Subordinator shall not demand, collect or 
receive any payments upon the principal of, or interest on, or 
fees with respect to, the Junior Debt except disbursements made by 
Beneficiary as set forth in the Arrangement Agreement, the 
Intercreditor Agreement or other agreements contemplated by or 
executed pursuant to the same. Debtors agree that until full 
payment and satisfaction of the Senior Debt, it will not hereafter 
make any payments to Subordinator for application on the Junior 
Debt, all payments or remittances of any kind with respect to the 
Junior or Senior Debt to be made to Beneficiary for application in 




5. Receivership, Insolvency or Bankruptcy, In the event 
of any receivership, insolvency, bankruptcy, assignment for the 
benefit of creditors, reorganization (whether or not pursuant to 
bankruptcy law), sale of all or substantially all the assets, 
dissolution, liquidation or any other marshalling of the assets 
and liabilities of any of the Debtors, Subordinator covenants to 
cooperate with Beneficiary and to take any steps directed by 
Beneficiary as necessary to prove, enforce and"endeavor to obtain 
payment of the principal of and interest on the Junior Debt and 
will then pay over, but only out of and to the extent of any 
proceeds realized therefrom, to Beneficiary amounts thereof 
sufficient to pay in full the Senior Debt, after application of 
all other payments made to Beneficiary with respect to the Senior 
Debt. In the event of any distribution of the assets of the 
Debtors, whether directed by a court of bankruptcy jurisdiction 
otherwise, Beneficiary shall be entitled to full satisfaction of 
the Senior Debt prior to any payments or distributions to 
Subordinator with respect to the Junior Debt. The Junior Debt 
shall be subject to a security interest in favor of Beneficiary to 
secure both this Agreement and the Senior Debt, (Beneficiary 
having the rights and remedies of a secured creditor pursuant to 
the Uniform Commercial Code); and, with respect to any 
receivership, insolvency, bankruptcy, assignment for the benefit 
of creditors, reorganization or any other voluntary or involuntary 
proceeding under any bankruptcy or insolvency law. Debtors and 
Subordinator agree that Beneficiary may, at its option, claim 
payment of the Junior Debt (to be applied towards payment of the 
Senior Debt pursuant to this Agreement) including any payments or 
bankruptcy proceeds or dividends, that might otherwise be claimed 
by Subordinator, directly from the trustee or representative of 
Debtor's estate in such proceeding, and may enforce such claims in 
Subordinator*s name. Subordinator agrees to furnish all 
assignments, powers or other documents requested by Beneficiary to 
facilitate such direct collection by Beneficiary or for 
Beneficiary's establishment and perfection of its existing and 
intended security interests and liens in the Collateral 
hereunder. Beneficiary may file claims in any such proceeding in 
Subordinator's name and on Subordinator's behalf (for the benefit 
of Beneficiary pursuant to this Agreement) and in no event shall 
Subordinator waive, forgive or cancel any claim it may now or 
hereafter have against Debtors. In the event that Beneficiary 
does so elect to claim directly against the trustee or 
representative of Debtor's estate, Subordinator hereby grants to 
Beneficiary an irrevocable proxy to vote its claim in any such 
proceeding in any meeting of creditors or in any other proceeding 
or action wherein creditors are granted voting rights and agrees 
to execute all further documents requested by Beneficiary to 
facilitate exercise of this proxy. 
-4-
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6. Transfer of Junior Debt. Subordinator covenants and 
agrees that until the payment in full of the Senior Debt, it will 
not attempt to sell, assign or otherwise transfer or further 
encumber the Subordinated Note or any interest therein or any 
other instrument evidencing any obligation of the Junior Debt 
without first procuring and delivering to Beneficiary evidence in 
writing of the agreement of the purchaser, pledgee, assignee or 
transferee of the Subordinated Note or any other interest of the 
Junior Debt to comply with all terms, conditions and provisions of 
this Agreement. The rights of Beneficiary hereunder shall inure 
to the benefit of its successors and assigns. Subordinator 
further agrees to endorse the Subordinated Debt Instruments in 
favor of Beneficiary or its order and to deliver the Subordinated 
Debt Instruments to Beneficiary until this Agreement is no longer 
in effect, and Subordinator agrees to endorse over or assign to 
Beneficiary any other negotiable instruments constituting part of 
the Junior Debt, whether now or in the future. 
7. Beneficiary's Rights. Beneficiary may at any time in 
its discretion, renew or extend the time of payment of the Senior 
Debt or exercise, fail to exercise, waive or amend any other of 
its rights, under any instrument evidencing or securing or 
delivered in connection with the Senior Debt and may make and 
enter into such agreements as to the Senior Debt may seem proper 
or desirable to Beneficiary ia its sole discretion, all without 
notice to or further assent from Subordinator, and any such action 
shall not in any manner impair or affect this Agreement or any of 
Beneficiary's rights hereunder* Specifically, but not by way of 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, Beneficiary may, in the 
event of a default by Debtors or any of them under the terms of 
the Senior Debt, exercise any and all remedies which it may have 
under the Senior Debt or any of the loan documents oT "security 
agreements, trust deeds or mortgages connected thereto or 
otherwise without prior notice to, or the need for any consent or 
approval by, Subordinator. Subordinator hereby expressly consents 
to any extension, modification, amendment or renewal of the Senior 
Debt, and further consents to Beneficiary's release of the 
Collateral or of any other collateral or security provided by 
Debtors for the Senior Debt. Subordinator hereby waives and 
agrees not to assert against Beneficiary any rights which a 
guarantor or a surety with respect to any indebtedness of Debtors 
could exercise, although nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to constitute Subordinator a guarantor or surety. 
8. Continuing Effect. This Subordination Agreement 
shall constitute a continuing agreement of subordination and shall 
remain in effect until the entire Senior Debt, and all ancilliary 
fees, costs or other obligations of Debtors to Beneficiary, shall 
have been paid to Beneficiary to Beneficiary's satisfaction. This 
-5-
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Agreement shall be modified or amended only by a writing executed 
by all parties hereto. 
9. Enforcement. Beneficiary shall be entitled to 
recover its attorney's fees, court costs, and other legal expenses 
against Subordinator and/or Debtors in the event that Beneficiary 
is required to enforce this Agreement. 
10. Miscellaneous. Time is of the essence of this 
Agreement. This Agreement is entered into and governed by the 
laws of the State of Utah. Waiver of any right or remedy 
hereunder and amendment hereof shall only be effective when 
accomplished in writing signed by the part to be charged with the 
same. 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A. 
"SUBORDINATOR" 
By: ' ^  ^--^'-v 
Title:
 ^>.,W, c- 7^'.. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. 
"BENEFICIARY" 
Bv: J£?^V- <$S1S, 
Title: ,. /" 
"DEBTORS" 
PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT CO. (aka 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT 
-6-
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A 3 / £ ^ 
Enoch Richard Smiths 
ENOCH SMITH SONS COMPANY 
ENOCH SMITH, COMPANY 
WEAVERS QUALITY WELDING 




STATE OF DTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY ^ OF SALT LAKE) 
On the zV day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me .<° r/ p, j-j , who being by me duly sworn, did say 
that he is the S_ \s.. , A . , of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF 
UTAH. N.A. ("First Interstate") and that the above and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said First Interstate by 
authority of its bylaws/resolution of its board of directors, and 
said ,Q ¥/ x? .. .. acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the ^-T day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me /v**.. *~ A. w, w, LA , who being by me duly sworn, did say 
that he is the •.c < ." .• of FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
UTAH, N.A. ("First Security") and that the above and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said First Security by 
authority of its by laws/resolution of its board of directors, and 
said M^ &> &• //i~~^f<*^-*. acknowledged to B » that said 
corporation executed the same. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
- 8 -
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at : (I < > ^ f- ^tg#>o f,»,^Tr, 
(' 
NOTARY PUBLIC^
 n , ^ 
Residing at:ofc/./' *y( js? CJLL* 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
ss. 
On the 2£? day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me Enoch Richard Smith, who being by me duly sworn, did say that 
he is a general partner of Park Meadows Development Co., a 
partnership, and that the above and foregoing instrument was 
signed on behalf of the said partnership by authority granted 
under and in accordance with governing partnership agreements and 
the consent of other partners, and said Enoch Richard Smith 
acknowledged to me that said partnership executed the same. 




Residing at: 0 ^ . Z / *&** (U< 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the 2$ day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me Enoch Smith, Jr., satisfactorily proved to me to be the signer 
of the above instrument by the oath of rw_; . /-. ~ _.,. a 
competent and credible witness for that purpose, by me duly sworn, 
and he, the said Enoch Smith, Jr., acknowledged that he executed 
the same. 
KY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
Qj<&,u± Id ^dMdhd. 
NOTARY PUBLIC. ~ - » "J 
Residing it:XS<xZrJrfi/a 'y>t^.ti 
STATE 0? UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the iV day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me Enoch Richard Smith, satisfactorily proved to me to be the 
-9-
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signer of the above instrument by the oath of fit^ y, , /fv.-Zr,-..^,. r", 
a competent and credible witness for that purpose, by me duly r 
sworn, and he, the said Enoch Richard Smith, acknowledged that he 
executed the same. 
NOTSK? PUB LIC 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: Residing at: U>/£// , ^ j ^ / rt/L^. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the jrT day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me Margaret Smith*, satisfactorily proved to me to be the signer of 
the above instrument by the oath of 1>^^. L r H*. +f.m.. a 
competent and credible witness for that purpose, by me duly sworn, 
and"she, the said Margaret Smith, acknowledged that she executed 
the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ , ,, . 
KY COKMISSION EXPIRES: Residing at;(^ f ^ j L T f - ^ h J . Y C/J/sxiKf 
STATZ OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY Or SALT LAKE) 
On the T>>"day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me T,, . L o <.*.. -H. . who being by me duly sworn, did say 
that he is the s.^. *.-. , of Enoch Smith Sons 
Company, a corporation, and that the above and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority 
of its bylaws/resolution of its board of directors, and 
-10-
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said r-'•.-,/. £ <LJ-V acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
NOTSKY "PUBLICL^ '
 f /? J ' 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: Res id ing a t : 5&Z/jr p%J?y 
"3/1? 1*1 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the jijf day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me .n„ s zy ^ __ rr , who being by me duly sworn, did say that 
he is the K,, „ : . of Enoch Smith Company, a 
corporation, and that the above and foregoing instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its 
bylaws/resolution of its board of directors, and said 
/• } /> <^.-rt acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^  * j , // 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: Residing at: ^TCC-r- Sffi/J L'yit^XZj 
&t>?ie<i v 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the ^ # day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me /y /.#<?< .-. ,T7? who being by me duly sworn, did say that 
he is the •/- *V . of Weavers Quality 
Welding, a corporation, and that the above and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority 
of its bylaws/resolution of its board of directors, and said 
/>!,./. jp. Su^/7Z. acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ , / ) / / ? ^ 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: Residing at: ^rrtJr- yyt Jr'0 (/)(/.A^U 
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EXHIBIT B TO SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT 
SUBORDINATED COLLATERAL DOCUMENTS 
1. Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents Dated May 12th 1981 with 
Park Meadows Development Company as Trustor, Walker Bank & Trust 
Company as trustee and beneficiary and recorded as Entry No, 179474 
in Book M187 at pages 132-36 of the records of the Summit County 
Recorder. 
2. Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents Dated September 22, 1981 
with Park Meadows Development Company as Trustor, First Interestate 
Bank of Utah as trustee and beneficiary and recorded as Entry No. 
183994 in Book M199 at pages 398-402 of the records of the Summit 
County Recorder* 
3. Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents Dated December 24, 1981 
with Park Meadows Development Company as Trustor, First Interstate 
Bank of Utah as trustee and beneficiary and recorded as Entry No. 
187434 in Book M208 at pages 158-162 of the records of the Summit 
County Recorder* 
4. Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents Dated August 20, 1982 with 
Park Meadows Development Company as Trustor, First Interstate Bank 
of Utah as trustee and beneficiary and recorded as Entry No. 195194 




JACK NICKLAUS COLT COURSE 
Beginning at a point which is North 1304.60 feet and East 
225i;00 feet froa the Southwest corner of Section 4, Township 2 
South, Bange 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point 
also being the Southeast corner of Park Meadows Subdivision-So. 
2, and running thence along said Subdivision boundary as 
followst Forth 401.67 feet? thence Korth 25* 30* Bast 455.97 
feetf thence North 44* 29* 36* West 684.07 feetr thence North 
12* 20* 30" West 50.21 feet to the Southeast corner of Park 
Meadows Subdivision Wo. 3; thence along said Subdivision 
boundary as follows: North 12* 20* 30* West 489.84 feet; thence 
North 22* 00* East 77.62 feet: to a point on a 74.00 foot radius 
curve to the'right, the radus point of vhich bears South 68* 
00* East 74.00 feet; thence Northeasterly along the are of said 
curve 73.62 feet to a point of .tangeney; thence North 79* 00' 
East 87.86 feet; thence North 11* 00' West 56.00 feet; thence 
leaving raid Subdivision boundary North 6* 00' East 200.00 feet; 
thence North 45* 00* East 100.00 feet; thence North 71* 30* East 
575.00 feet; thence North 4* 00* West 200.00 feet; thence North. 
29* 00* East 500.00 feet; thence North 42* 00* East 530.00 feet; 
thence North 15* 00* West 60.00 feet; thence North 58* 30* East 
273.367 feet; thence South 89* 40' 11" East 192.23 feet to the 
center of section line; thence North 0* 10* 43* East along said 
center of section line, 331.98 feet to the Rorth Quarter corner 
of Section 4, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence South 89* 52* 45* East along the section line, 
1196.804 feet; thence leaving said section line and running 
South 45* 25* 30* East 63.16 feet to a'point on a 633.00 foot 
radius curve to the left, the radius point of vhich bears North 
44* 34* 31* East 633.00 feet; thence Southeasterly along the arc 
of said curve 288.08 feet to a point of tangencyj thence South 
71* 30* East 338.77 feet to a point on a 665.76 foot radius 
curve to the left, the radius point of which bears North 18s 30' 
East 665.76 feet; thence Southeasterly along the arc of said 
curve 120.18 feet; thence due South 95.24 feet; thence South 22* 
00* East 742.914 feet; thence South 392.561 feet; thence South 
53* 30' East 100.57 feet; thence North 75* 00' East 102.49 feet; 
thence South 13* 00' East 818.42 feet; thence South 66* 30' East 
77.08 feet to a point on the West boundary of the Sunny slope B 
Park Meadows No. 6A Subdivision, said point also being on a 
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616.31 foot radius curve to the left, the radius point of which 
bears South 66* 30' East 616.31 feetf thence Southwesterly along 
said West boundary and along the arc of said curve 249.44 feet 
to a point of tangeney, thence South 0* 18' 38* West 46.35 feet; 
thence South 0* 05' 40* West 225.54 feet; thence North 89* 54' 
20* West 7.50 feet; thence South 0* 05* 40* West 270.00 feet to 
a point on the North boundary of park Meadows No. 5 Subdivision; 
thence along said North boundary as follows* due West 209.38 
feet; thence North 75* 00' West 372.00 feet; thence Sooth 7* 36* 
19* West 141.04 feat to a point on a 445.85 foot radius corre to 
the left, the radius point of vhieh bears South 4* 00' West 
445.85 feet; thence Westerly along the are of said curve 31.13 
feet to a point on a 331.89 foot radius compound curve to the 
.left, the radius point7of vhich bears South 331.89 feet; thence 
Southwesterly along the are of said curve 185.36 feet to a point 
of tangeney; thence South 58* 00' West 170.00 feet to a point en 
a 250.51 foot radius curve to the left, the radius point of 
which bears South 32* 00' East 250.51 feet; thence Southwesterly 
along the are of said curve 166.15 feet; thence North 67* 18' 
10--West 134.11 feet; thence South 17* 00* West 879.08 feet to a 
point en the North right-of-way line of Little Kate Road, said 
point also being on a 525.00 foot radius curve to the left, the 
radius point of which bears South 24* 04' West 525.00 feet; 
thence Westerly along said right-of-way line and along the arc 
of said curve 220.52 feet to a point of tangeney; thence due 
West along said right-of-way line 84 -14 feet to • point vhieh is . 
the Southeast corner of Racquet Club Village No. 2 P.U.D.; 
thenee along the East boundary of said Racquet Club Village as 
followst North 205.00 feet; thenee North 4* 39' 50* West 765.33 
feet; thence South 80* 10' 42* West 450.29 feet to a point which 
is the Northeast corner of Racquet Club Village No. 3 P.U.D.; 
thence along the North boundary of said Racquet Club Village No. 
3 as followss South 80* 10* 42* West 523.71 feet; thence due 
South 110.00 feet; thenee due West 195.51 feet to a point vhich 
is the Northeast corner of Racquet Club Village No. 1, P.U.D.j 
thence along the North boundary of said Racquet Club Village No. 
1 as followst due West 348.92 feet; thence South 57* 00' West 
438.34 feet; thence South 264.00 feet to the North line of 
Little Kate Road, said point also being en a 525.00 foot radius 
curve to the left; the radius point of which bears South 2* 56' 
49* West 525.00 feet; thence Northwesterly along the arc of said 
curve and North line 27.00 feet to a point of tangeney; thence 
West along said North line 315.00 feet to the point of 
beginning, i Q3Q3 
^en^ajjjs,-222.789 acres 
ALSO: 
DESCRIPTION' OF PMCZl NT*. 7 
Beginning at a point South 19* 52' 47* Cast along a seetion 
line 1)26.55 feet from the North quarter eorner of Seetion 4, 
Township 2 South, flange 4 East, Salt Lake Base and.Meridian 
and running thence South 19* S2* 47* East along a section line 
1326.55 feet to the Northeast corner of said Section 4; thenee 
South t-9* 52* 47* East along a seetion line 581.969 feet* 
t!.ence South 4(7.93 feet; thenee South 35* 00* East 309.90 
feet tc a point on a 475.00 foot radius curve to the right* 
the radius point of which bears North 3S* 00' West 475.00 
feet; thenee Southwesterly along the are of said curve 261.143 
feet to a point of tangeney: thenee South 06* 30' West 117.12 
feet to a point of a 20S.014 foot radius eurve to the left, 
tne radius point of which bears South 3* 30' East 205.014 
f*et; thence Southwesterly along the arc of said curve 100.169 
feet to a point of a 175.00 foot radius eurve to the right, 
the radius point of which b»ars North 31* 30' west .'75.00 
feet; thenee Southwesterly •Ion? the arc of said curve (1.087 
feet to a point of tangeney; thence South 70* 30' West 32.225 
feet to a point on a 433.00 foot radius curve to the left, the 
radius point of which bears South 75* 11* 24* West 4J310C 
feet; thenee Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 417.09 
feet to a point of a 167.00 foot radius curve to the right, 
the radius point of which bears North 20* 00' East 367.00 
feet; thence Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 179.35 
feet to a point of a 433.00 foot radius curve to th* left, the 
radius point of which bears South 4S* 00* West 43?.Co foot; 
thence Northwesterly along the arc of soul curve lb?.04 feet 
to a point of tangeney; thenee North €6* 45' West 162.00 feet 
to a point of a 513.00 foot radius eurve to the left, the 
radius point of whieh bears South 23* 15' West 513.00 feet: 
thence Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 176.62 feet 
to a point of a 599.76 foot radius curve to the riant, the 
radius point of which bears North 3* 30' 00* East »:«.7<*. fcct:thcrce 
Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 157.02 feet to a 
point of tangeney; thence North 71* 30' West 338.77 feet to a 
point of a 567.00 foot radaua -curve to the right, the radius 
point of which bears North 10* 30' East 567.00 feec; thence 
Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 206.34 feet; thenee 
Kortr. 31.60 feet to the point of beginning. 
Container104 969 acres. 
Itginnlng at I point which Is North 1304.60 f t t t and Cut 1251.00 ft t t from 
tf»o Seuthwtst corntr of Stctlon 4, Township 2 Soutft. tang* 4 Cast, Salt U U 
fast %r* Ntridlan. said point also btlng tftt Southtast comtr of Part Mtadows 
Sifcdivision No. 2. *nd running thtnct along said Subdivision boundary as 
follows: North 40I.-67-fttt; thtnct North 29*30* East-455,97 f t t t ; thtnct 
North U*29*36" Vtst-66rr07 f t t t ; thtnct North 12*20'30* Vtst ,50.21 f t t t to 
tht Southtast comtr of fart Mtadovs Subdivision No. 3; thtnct along said 
Subdivision boundary as follows: North 12*20*30- Vtst 469:5* f t t t ; thtnct 
north 22*00* Cast 22*62 f t t t to a point on t 74.00 foot radius curvt to tht 
right, tht radius point of which btars South M*00* Cast 74.00 f t t t ; thtnct 
Northtasttrly along tht arc of said curvt 73.62 f t t t to a point of tangtncy; 
thtnct North 79*00' Cast 62-86 f t t t ; thtnct North 11*00* Vtst 56.00 f t t t ; 
thtnct ltaving said Subdivision boundary North 6*00* Cast 40&A0 f t t t ; 
thtnct North 45*00* Cast W0HX> f t t t ; thtnct North 71*30' Casri75J30 f t t t ; 
thtnct North 4*00* Vtst 290*00-fttt; thtnct North 29*00' Cast S00.D0 f t t t ; 
thtnct North 42*00' Cast-530.*0 f t t t ; thtnct North 15*00' test 60.00 f t t t ; 
thtnct North 56*30* Cut 273.367 f t t t ; thtnct South 89*40'li* Cast 1S2.23 
f t t t to tht ctnttr of stctlon lint; thtnct North 0*10'43* Cast along said 
ctnttr of stctlon l int . 33UBa.fttt to tht North Qutrttr comtr of Stctlon 
4, Tovnship 2 South, ftangt 4 Cast. Salt Lata last and Mtridian; thtnct South 
t9*S2'4Sa Cast along tht stctlon lint, 1H6.804 f t t t : thtnct ltaving said 
stctlon lint ami running South 45*25*30* Cut 63.16/ttt to t point on a 
tUtOO foot radius curvt to tht l t f t , tht rttffut point of which btars north 
44*34*31* tart 633.00 f t t t ; thnct Southttsttrly along tht arc of sold c*rv* 
2S&48 f t t t to a point of tangtncy; thtnct South 71*30* Cast 336.77 f t t t to 
t point on a 665.76 foot radius curvt to tht l t f t9 tht radius point of which 
btars North 18*30* Cast 665.76 f t t t ; thtnct Southtuttrly along tht arc of 
said curvt 120*18 f t t t ; 
thtnct Out South 95rf< i t t t ; thtnct South 22*00* Cast 742.914 
f t t t ; thtnct South 39M61 f t t t ; thtnct South 53*30* Cut 100:57 f t t t ; thtnct 
North 75*00* Cast-102-40 f t t t ; thtnct South 13*00* Cut 81tr42 f t t t ; thtnct 
Sdutfr 66*30* Cut -77*08 f t t t to t point on tht Vtst boundary of th* Sunny* 1 opts 
Park Mtadovs No. 6A Subdivision, u ld point also btlng on a 616.31 foot 
radius curvt to tht I t f t . tht radius point of which btars South 66*30* Cast 
616.31 f t t t ; thtnct Southwtsttrly along said V*st boundary and along tht arc 
of said curvt 249.44 f t t t to a point of tangtncy. thtnct South 0*18'38" Vtst 
44.15 f t t t ; thtnct South 0*05*40* Vtst 22S-S4 f t t t ; thtnct North 69*54*20* 
Vtst JL50 f t t t ; ta»p**auth 0*05'40* Vtst 270.00 f t t t to a point on tht 
north boundary of Part Mtadovs No. 5 &£dlvislon; thtnct along said north 
boundary as follows: to* vast 209.38 f t t t ; thtnct North 75*00' Vtst 372.00 
fttt: thtnct South 7*36*19* Wtst 141JJ4 f t t t to a point on a 445.65 foot 
radius curv* to tht l t f t . tho radius point of utile* btars South 4*00f Vtst 
445.13 f t t t ; thtnet Mtsttrty fttofif tht arc of said curvt 31.13 f t t t to a 
point on a 331.89 foot radius confound curvt to tht l t f t . tht radius point 
of which btars South 331.89 f t t t ; thtnct Southwtsttrly along tht arc of said 
curvt 185.36 f t t t to a point of tangtncy; thtnct South 58*00' wtst 170.00 
foot to a point on a 250.51 foot radius curvt to tht l t f t . tht radius point 
of which btars South 32*00* Cast 250.-51 f t t t ; thtnct Southwtsttrly along 
tht arc of said curvt 166.15 f t t t ; thtnct North 67*18*10" Wtst 134.11 t t t t : 
thtnct South 17*00* Vtst 679.08 f t t t to a point on tht North right-of-way lint 
of U t t l t ftatt toad, said point also btlng on a 525.00 foot radius curva to 
tht l t f t . tht radius point of which btars South 24*04' Vtst 525.00 f t t t : 
thtnct VtiUrly along said right-of-way lint and along tha arc of said curvt 
220.52 f t t t to a point of tangtncy; thtnct dut Vtst along said right-of-way 
lint 84.14 f t t t to t point which is tht Southtast comtr of ftacqutt Club 
Villagt No. 2 P.U.O.; thtnct along tht Cast boundary of said ftacqutt Club 
Village as follows: North 205.00 f t t t ; thtnct North 4*39'50* Vtst 76S.33 
f t t t ; thtnct South 60*10*42* Vtst 450.29 f t t t to a point which Is tht 
Northtast corntr of ftacqutt Club Villagt No. 3 P.U.O.; thtnct along tht 
North boundary of said ftacqutt Club Villagt No. 3 as follows: South 80*10*42* 
Vtst.523.71 f t t t ; thtnct dut South 110.00 f t t t ; thtnct dut Vtst 195.51 f t t t 
to a polntTBhich is tht Northtast corntr of Racqutt Club Villagt No. I . P.U.O.; 
thtnct along tht North boundary of said ftacqutt Club Villagt No. 1 as follows: 
dut Vtst 348.92 f t t t ; thtnct South 57*00' Vtst 438.34 f t t t ; thtnct South 
264.00 fttt to tht North lint of U t t l t Catt ftoad. said point also bting on 
a 525.00 foot radius cunrt to tht l t f t ; tht radius point of which btars South 
2*56* 49* Vtst 525.00 f t t t ; thtnct Northwtstarly along tht arc of said curvt 
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end North line 27.00 feet to • point of tangency; ***** Nest •long tald 
Horn lint 315.00 f t t t to the point of beginning. 
beludlna tfterefree. the following parcels en* these portion* of the above 
described property required to provide double access for vehicles end ped-
estrians paved for • width reasonably required by applicable governmental 
agencies to provide suitable-eccess to tfte below described properties. 
USS MO CXCEPTING PMCXL #5 FOUflMNS: 
Beginning at e point which Is Worth 1910.02 feet end Cart 4082.25 feet from 
the Southwest corner of Section 4. Township 2 South. fUnge 4 East. Salt Lake 
tese end Meridian. Mid point also being the northwest corner of the Perk 
Meadows No. 5 Subdivision, and running thence North 10*30' East 507.19 feet: 
thence South 74*00' Cast 524.06 feet to a point on the Northerly boundary of 
Mid Park Meadows No. 5 Subdivision, and running thence along said boundary 
as follows: South 7*36'19* Nest 141.04 feet to a point on a 445.85foot 
radius curve to the left , the radius point of which bears Soutn 4*00' West 
445.85 feet; thence Westerly along the are of said curve 31.13 feet to a 
point on a 331.89 foot radius compound curve to the left.the radius point of 
which bears South 331.89 feet; thence Southwesterly «lo«J.«je arc of said 
curve 185.36 feet to a point of tangency; thence South 58*00' * • « W.00 
feet to • point on a 250.51 foot radius curve, to the left, the radius point 
of which beers South 32*00* Cast 250.51 feet; thence Suothwesttrly along the 
art of said carve 166.15 feet; thence Nertft 67*1*'10* Nut U4. l t fact to 
the point of beginning. 
PCSCT1PT10N Of HPCCl NO. 7 
Beginning at a point South 89*S2,47* Cast along a section line 1326.55 feet 
frcmthe North quarter corner of Section 4. Township 2 South. Range 4 East. 
Salt Lake fair vti Meridian and running thence South 89*52*47" East along a 
section line 1326.55 feet to the Northeast comer of said Section 4; thence 
South 89*52'47* East along a section line 581.969 feet; thence South 467.93 
feet; thence South 35*00' Cast 309.90 feet to a point on a 475.00 foot radius 
point of U n g S " ! £ £ e SouS*8$3 0 '^ .2 til',??9 Hl'M f M t to a toot radius curve to the left the S t i l ^ L ! ! ? * * ! f m to • W « of a 205.014 
Cast 205.014 rm;%^lSk»S^l^&1^^^ * • ? *"* 3*30^  
feet to a point of a 175 OOfM* «!f..J i i ? P* , r c o f M , d »rvt 100.189 
of -hi* eSrTlfStfS 31*3? !Z ITSM SB? & £ SffiL*?* radius » ? « 
ass'/—^ ^SSEMSS ^ M r * 
EXHIBIT C TO SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT 
PARX MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED ENTITIES; 
WORKOUT ARRANGEMENT WITH FIUT AND FSB 
1. At.the contemplated closing, interest in the approximate sum 
of*$600,000, will be brought current on all loans of both 
Banks to Park Meadows Development and related entities. The 
source of funds will be $200,000 from the Smiths and loans 
proceeds from FSB, if approved. 
2. Mark Howell will seek FSB approval of a loan to PMD in the 
maximum sum of $1,000,000 to be utilized to pay the balance 
of accrued interest, general claimants ($164,000), and Jack 
Nicklaus ($13,900), and to provide working capital needs in 
the future. Such future draws will be permitted only after 
submission and approval of detailed budgets and/or invoices 
to both banks. PMD will provide notification of actual 
expenditures to both banks• Such loan shall be secured by 
a first priority lien (by reason of subordination) on all 
properties subject to the blanket mortgage mentioned in 
paragraph 4 hereafter (except for First Federal's trust deeds). 
3. PMD will be allowed to pay the $300,000 debt to Enoch Smith 
Sons Company out of lot sale proceeds at the rate of S percent 
of such proceeds. This will require total sales of 
$6,000,000. 
4. A blanket mortgage for the benefit of FSB and FIUT will be 
placed on all of Park Meadows properties (exclusive of Park 
Meadows Mountain), and the assets of Enoch and Dick Smith. 
This mortgage will not disturb the first trust deeds of First 
Federal or FSB as to Gleneagles and Lot 1765, but will cover 
any equity in those properties. Said mortgage will exclude 
the following assets of Enoch and Margaret Smith: Their home, 
two cars. Country Club membership* $250,000 in cash, $184,000 
worth of securities to be identified, two stud horses, life 
insurance, and Enoch Smith Sons Company and its assets. Also 
excluded are the real property where Enoch Smith Sons Company 
is located and all other stock in that company. Enoch Smith 
£AAS Company will remain liable to FIUT on the $500,000 loan. 
The blanket mortgage will secure all debt of PMD to FSB and 
FIUT, and also the debts to FIUT of Smith Park Acres Ranch, 
Enoch Smith Company, Weaver Quality Welding, and the "Ayers" 
loan. The "Ayers" loan will cease to be an obligation of 
Enoch Smith Sons Co. 
5. Enoch and Margaret Smith will be released from whatever 
personal liability may exist on the FSB debt, FIUT's PMD, 
Enoch Smith Co. and Smith Park Acres loans and the "Ayers-
loan. Enoch Smith will retain whatever liability he now has 
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on the $300,000 Enoch Smith Sons Company loan. Dick Smith 
will aot have pergonal liability on the "Ayers~ debt* 
6. The Enoch Smith Sons Company $500,000 loan will be repayable 
by quarterly interest only payments for one year with a due 
date in one year at a rate of FIUT's prime rate plus fc\ and 
prime rate plus 2%% after default. It will be renewable on 
the same terms for an additional year if no default exists. 
7. Smiths to provide Banks with budgets acceptable to banks and 
schedule of price listings for lots, including variables for 
bulk sales, for Banks' approval. If parties can't agree with 
respect to prices, the parties agree to select a mutually 
acceptable third party to set prices, considering current 
market and need to sell within a relatively short period of 
time. 
8- Sales proceeds to be allocated as follows after payment of 
commissions: Allowed first; trust deeds release prices where 
applicable (First Federal and First Security's Gleneagles, and 
lot 1765); some allowance for working capital needs; balance 
to FIUT and FSB for their agreed pro rata distribution. 
9. Pro rata distribution with FIUT and FSB: Straight pro rata 
based on relative total debt for accrued interest (exclusive 
of "Ayers" debt): Principal reductions to pay off FSB first, 
including the loan under paragraph 2 above, then remainder to 
FIUT. Essentially, FIUT subordinates to FSB. The order of 
payment of FIUT's loans secured by the blanket mortgage will 
be as follows: $100,000 loan to Enoch Smith Co.; $250,000 
loan to Smith Park Acres Ranch; $150,000 loan to Weavers 
Quality Welding; loans to Park Meadows Investments; "Ayers" 
loan. In the event that the Kentucky ranch is sold, the 
proceeds will be applied to the extent necessary to pay the 
Smith Park Acres loan, with any excess to be considered 
proceeds of the blanket mortgage. If assets of Weavers 
Quality Welding are sold, the net proceeds will be applied to 
that company's loan. 
10. Require retention of professional sales or project manager 
either initially or if performance falters. 
11. Banks to be informed of any and all offers, firm or tentative, 
to purchase lots, parcels, the whole project, etc. 
12. Banks will use best efforts to satisfy obligations out of 
collateral other than Park City ranch. 
-2-
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13. Dismissal of FSB's pending foreclosure action and press 
release of same. 
14. Enoch and Dick Smith will subordinate their right as partners 
of Park Meadows Investment to receive proceeds from Park 
Meadows Mountain to FIUT's *Ayers" loan, 
15. All of the loans to be secured by the blanket mortgage and the 
new loan which is provided in paragragh 2 above shall be 18 
month term loans, with interest payable on a quarterly basis 
commencing September 1, 1985, interest accruing at the rate of 
%\ above the prime rate of the respective banks. Interest on 
"Ayers" loan to be deferred to maturity date. Loan 
documentation shall include the agreement and obligation of 
Park Meadows Development and the Borrowers to meet agreed 
upon dollar volumes of property sales from the Park Meadows 
project by agreed upon guideline dates. A failure to meet 
those goals will constitute a default under the terms of the 
loan documentation, provided however, that a reasonable period 
(to be hereafter determined in the reasonable discretion of 
the Banks) will be allowed for cure and reinstatement. Cure 
and reinstatement will be conditioned upon evidence, 
satisfactory to FSB and FIUT that the sales required for 
satisfaction of the goals are immediately forthcoming or that 
they, in fact, have occurred; and, further, upon reasonable 
satisfaction of FSB and FIUT that the reasons for the failure 
to meet the goals are not to continue or result in any 
substantial likelihood of further defaults and failures. FSB 
and FIUT will agree that an additional 18 month term will be 
granted so long as the aforesaid sales goals are being met and 
no other defaults exist under the loan documents. In this 
connection, it is agreed that, net of amounts due to First 
Federal on properties on which it maintains 1st priority 
encumbrances, all sale proceeds shall be applied as set forth 
in the paragraphs above. 
IS. If default occurs en* is not cured as provided in paragraph IS 
above, interest will accrue at the rate of 2%\ above the 
respective prime rates of the respective banks. 
Agreed to this 19th day of June, 198S. 





Richard Smith - f< 
Park Meadows Investment 
fka Park Meadows Development 
Enoch Smith Sons Company 
Enoch Smith Co* 
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EXHIBIT E TO THE SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT 
SENIOR FSB COLLATERAL DOCUMENTS 
That certain Deed of Trust Dated March 23, 1983 among Park Meadows 
Development Company, Enoch Smith Company, Enoch Smith, Jr. and 
Enoch Richard Smith as Trustors, Alta Title Company as Trustee and 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. as beneficiary and recorded March 
29, 1983 as Entry No. 203850 in Book M255 at pages 463-478 of the 
records of the Summit County Recorder. 
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AMENDMENT TO SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT 
ON THIS /? day of July, 1985f the undersigned parties, 
being the parties to that certain Subordination Agreement between 
them dated June 28, 1985 (the •'Subordination Agreement*), enter 
into this Amendment to Subordination Agreement to effect an 
amendment to the Subordination Agreement. 
Pursuant to and in compliance with the requirements of 
the Subordination Agreement regarding execution of additional 
documents or agreements to effectuate the intent of the 
Subordination Agreement, the undersigned parties agree as follows: 
The Subordination Agreement is hereby amended to attach 
and substitute a revised version of EXHIBIT E TO THE SUBORDINATION 
AGREEMENT - SENIOR FSB COLLATERAL DOCUMENTS, Accordingly, it is 
hereby agreed that the exhibit attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference as EXHIBIT A hereto, shall be and is 
hereby substituted for and becomes EXHIBIT E TO THE SUBORDINATION 
AGREEMENT - SENIOR PSB COLLATERAL DOCUMENTS. The Subordination 
Agreement is further hereby amended to attach and substitute a 
revised EXHIBIT "B-l". Accordingly, it is hereby agreed that the 
Exhibit attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference 
as EXHIBIT "B-l" hereto, shall be and is hereby substituted for 
and becomes EXHIBIT "B-l" to the Subordination Agreement. 
The Subordination Agreement shall, in all other respects, 
remain in full force and effect, provided that all references 
therein to EXHIBIT E shall be deemed to be references to EXHIBIT A 
hereto. References to EXHIBIT B-l in the Subordination Agreement 
shall be deemed to be references to EXHIBIT B hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the signatures below are affixed on 
the date first set forth hereinabove. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A. 
Its? 
'/?iT+3' 
fro? w&Ac&r By. ItS!
 A.^A-. 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO. ENOCH SMITH SONS COMPANY 
BV^L^^ ^ l^^Lj^A By^C^^L^l 
lts
'.£c-.^<- r+.-r-J/- Its: £/,< S?-'* 5 
ENOCH SMITH COMPANY WEAVERS QUALITY WELDING, INC. 
ENOCH R 
MARGARET SMITH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
88. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
On the <?s^day of July, 19S5,'personally appeared before 
me 7?^ ,v>g_ri- M-. A L I » M / who being by me duly sworn, did say 
that he is the S<. V.oc P,...»:„•. of FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF 
UTAH, N.A. ("First Interstate") and that the above and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said First Interstate by authority 
of its bylaws/resolution of its board of directors, and 
said /rafcg/f- f+. ooe/ht acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
L 
NOTARY PUBLIC . 5 1 
^Ur-, < (fa Residing at:^//-r kdL 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
* 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
SS. 
,^, On the ^ ?^t3ay of July, 1985, personally appeared before 
me <g^ ~[/ ZX>//S /f^ /? t who being by me duly sworn, did say 
(•First Security") and that the above and foregoing the Uce ?5> Of FIRST SECURITY BANK OF that "he is UTAH, N.A. 
instrument was signed in behalf of said First Security by 
authority of its bylaws^r,esolution of its board of directors, and 
said £. (/. fX„.l *7Z acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same. 






STATE OP UTAH > 
S3. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the //*-"' day of Julyf 1985, personally appeared before 
me Enoch Richard Smith, who being by me duly sworn, did say that 
he is a general partner of Park Meadows Development Co., a 
partnership, and that the above and foregoing instrument was 
signed on behalf of the said partnership by authority granted 
under and in accordance with governing partnership agreements and 
the consent of other partners, and said Enoch Richard smith 
acknowledged to me that said partnership executed the same. 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f i f n . 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
NOTARY TUBfrlC / ~ / / 
Residing at: _ ^C^XXU^ MS. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On 
me Enoch Sm 
of the above instrument by tho oath of 
competent, and credible wiLau63 foe that purpose, by me duly sworn, 
and he, the said Enoch Smith, Jr., acknowledged that he executed 
the same. 
the // day of July, 1985, personally appeared before 
ith, Jr., satisfactorily proved Lu/merto be the signer 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
NOTARY PU 
Residing at: ^SS
 t<r&X^ / 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
ss. 
On the //^day of July, 1985, personally appeared before 
me Enoch Richard Smith, safciflfaiLurily pi'oved4£o me to be the 
signer of the above instrument fry the oath of-
a .competent and iiedibla wlLims.i> fui that purpose, by me duly 
sworn, and he, the said Enoch RichjLtd Smith, acknowledged that he 
executed the same. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
NOTARY PUBLIC - ^ / / 
Residing at: ^SJf-^LS. /tJ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
/ ^ d 
S3. 
On the ^> ay of July, 1985, p^rsojQally appeared before 
me Margaret Smith, satisfactorily proved/to me to be the signer of 
the above instrument by tho oath of-
and she, the said Margaret Smith,^acknowledged that she executed 
the same. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
fiOTXRY PUBLIC "y * y ~7~ 
Residing at: ^£yjS'^XLA\ && 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE) 
tharhe is the /A**?-****; 
of July, 1985, personally appeared before 
, who being by me duly sworn, did say 
of Enoch Smith Sons 
Company, a corporation, and that the above and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority 
of its,bylaws/resolution of its boajid of directors, and 
szi&/7*rZ dtfl/**2r*~fmM( acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. / / • 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
NOTARY PUBL-te^ 
 mj9 S / 
Residing at: ^^6^^^6. U^. 
STATE OF DTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) as. 
me, 
. On .the of July, 1985, personally appeared before 
w t ^ e / y ^ ^ / O s ^ y > ! ^ 9 who being by me duly sworn, did say that 
he is the V~+±~/s? **>;*/*><« >* ^___ of Enoch Smith Company, a 
corporation, and that the above and foregoing instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its 
^law^resolufcipq of its board of^directors, and said 
^ / / ; / ^ A , V / / acknowledged td me that said cor 
executed the same. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
rporation 
NOTARY PUBL-IC ^
 y / 
Residing at: ^ g ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ / 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
of July, 1985, personally appeared before 
_,, who being by me duly sworn, did say that 
X/e^y of Weavers Quality 
Welding, a corporation, and that the above and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority 
:ion of its board of directors, and said 
acknowledged to me that said corporation 
NOTARY PUBLIC CIUT AX r D I  y y 
Kt CQttMISSIOK EXPIRES: Residing at: ^£ J?J<'^Z£ /*( £/ 
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a TO AMENDED SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT 
SUBSTITUTED EXHIBIT E TO THE SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT 
SENIOR FSB COLLATERAL DOCUMENTS 
That certain Deed of Trust Dated March 23, 1983 among Park Meadows 
Development Company, Enoch Smith Company, Enoch Smith, Jr. and 
Enoch Richard Smith as Trustors, Alta Title Company as Trustee and 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. as beneficiary and recorded March 
29, 1983 as Entry No. 203850 in Book M255 at pages 463-478 of the 
records of the Summit County Recorder; and 
That certain Deed of Trust Dated June 28, 1985 between Park Meadows 
Development Company/ Enoch Smith Company, Enoch Smith, Jr. and 
Enoch Richard Smith as Trustors, First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. as Trustee and Beneficiary and recorded June 28, 1985 as 
Entry No. 235936 in Book 347 at pages 295-320 of the Records of 
the Summit County Recorder and as Amended in the Amendment to 
Trust Deed dated the day of July, 1985, between Park 
Meadows investment Co. Enoch Smith Company, Enoch Smith Jr. and 
Enoch Richard Smith as Trustors, and First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., both as Trustee and.as Beneficiary and recorded July , 
1985. as Entry No. in Book _ _ ^ _ _ at pages 
' of the records of the Summit County Recorder. 
JACK NICKLAUS COLT COURSE 
Beginning at a point which is North 1304.80 feet and Bast 
L25i:00 feet from the Southwest corner of Section 4, Township 2 
South, Nange 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point 
ilso being the Southeast corner of park Meadows Subdivision-So. 
2, and running thence along said Subdivision boundary as 
followst North 401.67 feett thence North 25* 30* East 455*97 
feett thence North 44* 29' 36s Nest €84.07 feett thence North 
L2* 20' 30" West 50.21 feet to the Southeast corner of Park 
Meadows Subdivision No. 3; thence along said Subdivision 
boundary as followss North 12* 20' 30" West 489.84 feett thence 
north 22* 00' East 77*62 feet to a point on a 74.00 foot radius 
rurve to the'right, the radius point of which bears South €8* 
DO' Bast 74.00 feett thence Northeasterly along the arc of said 
surve 73.62 feet to a point of .tangencyt thence North 79* 00' 
East 87.86 feett thence North 11* 00* West 56.00 feett thence 
Leaving said Subdivision boundary North 6* 00' Bast 200.00 feett 
thence North 45* 00' East 100.00 feett thence North 71* 30* Bast 
575.00 feett thence North 4* 00' West 200.00 feett thence North. 
29* 00* East 500.00 feett thenee North 42* 00' Bast 530.00 feett 
.hence North 15* 00* West €0.00 feett thence'North 56* 30'*East 
'73.367 feett thenee South S3* 40' 11s East 192.23 feet to the 
:enter of section line} thence North O* 10' 43" Bast along said 
enter of section line, 331.98 feet to the North Quarter corner 
if Seetlon 4, Township 2 South, Nange 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
leridlant thenee South 89* 52" 45" East along the section line, 
.196.804 feett thenee leaving said section line and running 
;outh 45* 25' 30" East 63.16 feet to a* point on a 633.00 foot 
adius curve to*the left, the-radius point of which bears North 
4* 34' 31" East 633.00 feett thence Southeasterly along the are 
f said curve 288.08 feet to a point of tangencyt thenee South 
1* 30* East 338.77 feet to a point on a 665.76 foot radius 
urve to the left, the radius point of whieh bears North 18* 30' 
:ast 665.76 feett thence Southeasterly along the arc of said 
urve 120.18 feett thence due South 95.24 feett thenee South 22* 
0' East 742.914 feett thence South 392.561 feett thence Sooth 
3* 30* East 100.57 feett thenee North 75* 00* East 102.49 feett 
hence South 13* 00* East 618.42 feetj thence South 66* 30* East 
7.08 feet to a point en the West boundary of the Cunnyslopes 
•ark Meadows No* 6A Subdivision, said point also being on a 
•"2*".31 foot radius curve to th* *-** «^. 
bears South 66* 30 • East 616731 f f5*' J?* r a d * u « P°*«t of which 
said West boundary and alone 5 . ! ! ' S b t n e ! S o u t « « « t e r l y along 
t o a point of tendency, the?ce Luis ?5 ? i K c u r v e 2<*-<4 f e e t ' 
thence South 0» 05« 40- West 25f°"*b ° *•• 38* West 46.35 feett 
20- West 7.50 f e e t , thence " l o a t h ' " U^io^^i ??J t h 8 S # *<« 
• point en the Worth boundary of 1**ZK 4S W e i t 2 7°«°0 fee t t o 
thenca .along . . i d North boJndar^ I J ' M ? 1 * " * 5°* 5 * a * i v i s i o £ , 
f e e t , thence Worth 75^00^W*J?3?S tf^V Aue W e s t 209.38 
29 - West 141.04 f e e t to • point £ i j a s # 2 J , # t h ! a c t fioat* *# 36-
the l e f t , the radius point of whf?s J S ' 8 i f o o t r a d i u « curve t o 
445.85 f e e t , thence wHterly . J o n f t n l * ! ^ S ^ 11 0 0 ' W " * 
f e e t to a point on a 331 It fill f . i ? r c o f s a l d e«*ve 31.13 
l e f t , the radius point^oiuhichd^i co«P°und curve to the 
Southwesterly j loSg * . ^ ^ J & Z J ^ * * i » ffe f e ' tt«^ 
of tangency, thence South 58* 00* We«£ ??n « H 6 f t e t t o • P°i«t 
i 250.51 foot radius curve to the la J* li'°° £ e e t t o • P ° ^ en 
. ^hich bears South 32* 00* Ealt 250 I f i£* f*dlu* Point *f 
' along the arc of sa id curve 16615 Ji.Z* it t h e n c » Southwesterly 
0-^West 134.11 f e e t , thence South f ? I t ^ ? h e n c f t N o r t h «?* 18« * 
..oint on the Worth ri^h?!o1!waTiint efC? ^ ' V 7 9 ' 0 8 ' " " t o . 
point also being on a 52S.00 foot r ? d l 5 . i * U c **te Road, said 
-adius point of which bears South ? ! • « ! . c ? r v e t o t h « ***t , the 
hence Westerly along s a i l r i g h t ^ l v V ^ ! 2 5 - 0 0 *«*tj 
of said curve M 0 . S 2 faa4 to 2 «*?Sl^2 ¥** *"d * l c m » *••> arc 
v e s t along said r i g h t " ? ! * ! ? l i n e ^ f ?f ^ e n c y , thence due 
he Southeast corner of RalJuet Cl!n*v?if e e t 5° m P ° i n t «M*b i « 
-hence along the East bound??y of « . J 2 J l g e Ko« 2 * -* .D. , . 
followsi North 205.00 f e a t , ? h ! L ! £d Jf6**** Club Village as 
• >et, thence South 85° l 5 ? J 2 - W«t ^ll^K 3 d* S 0 * • • • t , 7M?33 
^ • S * N ? r t h e " f e corner of * i c q u " c i u o ' v f i ? " * *° * * o i n t ""** 
whence along the Worth boundary of «»?5 J l l l a 9 « N°* 3 P.D.D., 
- ' f u ^ l 0 " 8 * S o u t » «0- 10?"?-°£ * ! i J , ! * ; ? u ! t Club Village wo. 
•uth 110.00 f e e t , thence due Wes? lh*U'I1 f e e t ' t h««<* due 
<•« the northeast corner of SaccSet c i 2 i J o ? * ' t o a P ° l n t "Meh e n CJ ?Jo n 9 t h e K o r t h boundlry Jf f i?5 V i l l * 9 e No. 1 , P.u.O., 1
 as followst due West ?i« J 5 v * l d Ra<=q«et Club Vi l lae* i« 
'HIS* i " t ? tt«~- •"th<ai4?oo"Jitt5:"Ei: «5"» »* oo^K,?-
' . l t t le K.te Road, „ i d point i l « o h ! « - h e N c c t h l i n e «* 
: V'.£•«. J e f t , the «%?u«*p"„tei?9vh?c; J " ' 0 0 . 1 " ' " « « « 
•- We.t 52S.00 f e e t , thence nSrthw««t.M»ehbe«r l south 2* SC 
;ur« «na North l i n e 27.00 f , . t to I ~ f ? * i ° n 9 t h e * r c ot " « 
:-ntains 272.789 acres 
TabD 
"ADDENDUM D* 
DAVID R. OLSEN 
CHARLES 2. SAMPSON 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Accomeys for defendant Ayers 
174 South W*sc Temple 
Sale Laka City. Ucah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (301) 532-7300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a Ucah corporacioa, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO., 
a/k/a PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT ] 
CO., a Ucah partnership, 
MARGARET M. BECKER. VICTOR R. ] 
AYERS, MARION P. AYERS, ] 
J. LYNN DOUGAN. DIANA LADY ] 
DOUGAN. and FIRST SECURITY : 
BANK OF UTAH, N.A.. a banking. ; 
corporacioa vich ics ] 
principal place of business 
in Ucah, ; 
Defendants. 
FREDERICK G. BECKER II. 
MARGARET M. BECKER. J. LYNN ) 
DOUGAN and DIANA LADY DOUGAN, ) 
Third Parcy Plaiaciffs ) 
vs. ] 
ENOCH SMITH, JR.. and ) 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH. ) 
Third Parcy Defendants ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF VICTOR AYERS 
i Civil No. 9139 
> Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATS OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Viccor X. Ayers, having firsc been duly sworn on his oach 
deposes and scaces as follows: 
1. Viccor R. Ayers ("Ayers") is a defendanc in che above 
encicled accion and makes chis affidavic based on his personal 
knowledge. 
2. Ayers individually and chrough his business borrowed 
money on an unsecured basis from Firsc Incerscace Bank of Utah 
(FIBU), che balance of which on Augusc 29, 1983 was $3,271,975.00 
3. Ayers was a shareholder in Park Cicy Racquec Club, 
Inc., and as such signed as a guaxancor on cha Racquec Club Noce in 
December, 1978. 
4. Ayers was a partner in Park Meadows Oevelopmenc 
(PMD), later known as Park Meadows Investment, and when Park 
Meadows Development acquired the Racquec Club from che share-
holders of Park City Racquet Club, Inc., he signed an agreemenc 
to indemnify JV Lynn Dcugan and Frederick G« Backer on the 
Racquec Club Note, which Park Meadows Oevelopmenc and ics part-
ners had assumed and agreed co pay. 
5* In 1983, Ayers entered into a workout arrangement wich 
First Interstate Bank of Utah, in which he pledged and chen lacsr 
surrendered his equicy in Park Meadows Oevelopmenc co Firsc 
Interstate Bank of Ucah as securicy for the $3,271 ,975 debc. As 
pare of che worfcouc arrangemenc, Firsc Interstace Bank of Utah 
released Ayers from his obligacions on che $3.271r975 debc and 
„. .„ ?arfe Maadcvs Development debc including che Racquec CLub Loan. 
6- Ayars underscood and beLiaved frota 1983, chac Firsc 
Incarscaca Bank of Ucah raiaased him from aLL Park Meadows 
Davalopmanc debc co Firsc Incarscaca Bank of Ucah, incLudiag che 
Racquec CLub Noca. 
7. Ayars has bean a Licensed real ascaca salesman since 
September 1959, and has been a Licensed real escace brokar since 
1961. Ayers has rapresenced buyers and seLLars of real propercy 
in che Park Cicy area since 1974. 
3. Ayers became aware of che pending forecLosure on che 
park Meadows Racquec CLub in January or February 1986, and 
invescigaced che propercy co da carmine if he could markec ic co 
pocencial buyers. The invescigacion included obcaining and 
reviewing a cicLe reporc, and inquiring wich Dick Smich, Firsc 
Incerscace Bank of Ucah and che courc appoinced receiver. 
9. Ayers decermined chac significanc faccors seriously 
Limiced che markecabiLicy of che Racquec CLub including buc noc 
Liar iced co eh* foLLowingi 
(a) Ic was subjecc co che Park Meadows Oevelopmenc 
bLankec morcgages co Firsc Incerscace Bank of Ucah and Firsc 
Securicy Bank which covered vircually all of che PMD and Smich 
assets, and which secured debc of approximacely $ 15,000,000; 
(b) An invoLuncary bankrupccy was fiLed by FIBU againsc 
Park Meadows DavaLopmanc and ochars in March, 1986, scaying any 
furchar accion on che propercy; 
(c) Firsc Incarscaca Bank of Ucah cransfarrad pare of c^ a 
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PMD assecs. co ics siscer subsidiary FIMSA, chareby pravenciag 
martcecing che Park Meadows Development iacLudiag che goLf course 
and che Racquec CLub as an encire projecc chereby realizing ics 
full markec pocencial; and 
(d) FIBU failed and refused co reasonably respond co 
inquiries abouc che sale of che Racquec Club. 
10. IC was Ayers opinion in March, 1986 chac by reason 
of FIBU's accions described above chac che Racquec Club could noc 
be effeccively oarkeced co obcaia ics fair markac value, and chac 
opinion did noc change chrough che dace of che sheriff's sale. 
DATED chis ysI&p~Qt November, 1988. 
^ ; <^€^w 
Vtccor a. Ayers, 
STATE OF OTAH 




of tfavember, 1988, personally 
iccor R. Ayers who being by tne duly sworn, did 
igned and execucad c&fiforegoing inscnanenc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify chat a crue and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this 7 day of 
October, 1988, to: 
Mary Anne Q. Wood 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN 
Suite 900 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Hardin A. Whitney 
Jeff Robinson 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Oeseret Plaza 
No, 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901 
Attorneys for Defendant Park Meadows 
Investment Co,, a/k/a Park Meadows 
Development Co,, 
J, Michael Kelly 
Kent H. Murdock 
Enid Greene 
RAT, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deserec Building 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0358 
Attorneys for Defendant 
First Security Bank of Utah 
Glenn C* Hanni 
Mark J. Taylor 
STRONG 4 HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Dougans and Beckers 
(Poetry 
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